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ALLOCATING SPECTRUM BY MARKET
FORCES: THE FCC ULTRA VIRES?
The Communications Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act or the Act)' empowers
the Federal Communications Commission (the FCC or the Commission) to
regulate the use of radio frequency spectrum for broadcasting.2 The Act
prohibits the private ownership of spectrum 3 and provides instead that the
government shall maintain control over all radio channels.4 The Act in-
structs the FCC to assign frequencies,5 classify stations,6 and license radio
and television stations in a manner consistent with the "public convenience,
interest and necessity. '
Viewing the spectrum as a scarce public resource, courts have held that
the Act treats licensees as "trustees" who serve the public interest in return
for their privileged and regulated use of publicly owned radio spectrum.'
The Act thus embodies a "trusteeship" model of spectrum regulation.
1. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-
610 (1982)). Title III of the 1934 Act regulates radio communication including broadcasting.
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399.
2. See infra notes 3-7 and accompanying text. "Radio frequency spectrum" can be
thought of as a continuum of discrete frequencies that support radio communications. A "fre-
quency" is a particular and predetermined number of electromagnetic oscillations per second
(referred to as a cycle per second or "hertz"). Electromagnetic oscillations in radio transmit-
ting apparatus produce radio waves that travel via an antenna "over the air" to be detected by
a suitably equipped receiver. A "user" of spectrum is one who establishes a channel of radio
communication by using a particular radio frequency or set of frequencies. See generally H.
LEVIN, THE INVISIBLE RESOURCE: USE AND REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM 15-26
(1971); Levin, The Radio Spectrum Resource, 11 J.L. & ECON. 433 (1968); M. Mueller, Prop-
erty Rights in Radio Communication: The Key to Reform of Telecommunications Regulation
7-9 (June 3, 1982) (available at the CATO Institute, Washington, D.C.).
3. 47 U.S.C. § 301.
4. Id.
5. Id. § 303(c).
6. Id. § 303(a).
7. See, e.g., id. § 307(a).
8. See generally Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (Court ap-
proves of scarcity rationale); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943)
(1934 Act confers broad discretion on the Commission to regulate broadcasters in the public
interest); Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(overturning Commission policy statement on comparative renewals that violates the trustee-
ship model); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543,
548 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("broadcasters are temporary permittees-fiduciaries--of a great public
resource"); S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1959) (using scarcity rationale to justify
the equal time provisions of § 315 of the Communications Act of 1934), reprinted in 1959 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2564, 2571; infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
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Under this approach, licensees have no discretion to alter the principal type
of communications service they provide without specific Commission ap-
proval. An alternative model, the "market system" model of spectrum allo-
cation, is not expressly sanctioned by the 1934 Act. This model recognizes
competition among services for the right to use spectrum as an equally viable
approach to realize public interest goals. 9 Rather than have the Commission
decide (1) who is entitled to operate in specific portions of spectrum and
(2) the manner in which the spectrum is used, a market system model of
spectrum allocation relies on "market forces" to make these decisions.10
Under a pure marketplace approach, a maximum degree of private auton-
omy is granted to spectrum users and competition among the users would
directly determine the nature of the spectrum's use. "
After more than a half century of codification, the Commission is testing
the limits of the trusteeship model by proposing and adopting "marketplace"
regulatory alternatives.' 2 Extensive deregulation of the broadcast industry
by the Commission 13 has increased the autonomy of broadcast licensees14
9. See, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60
TEX. L. REV. 207, 209 (1982) (urging replacement of the trusteeship model with a marketplace
approach wherein broadcasters would be considered market participants).
10. See infra notes 139-53 and accompanying text.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 209; see also infra notes 13-15 and ac-
companying text.
13. See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding much of the FCC's elimination of radio station logkeeping, pro-
gramming guidelines and ascertainment requirements); see also Deregulation of Radio, 84
F.C.C.2d 968 (1981), reconsideration granted in part, denied in part, 87 F.C.C.2d 797, aff'd in
part, remanded in part sub nom. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (establishing quarterly issues/programs list recordkeep-
ing requirement to enable public to evaluate whether station is operating in the public interest),
on remand sub nom. Deregulation of Radio, 96 F.C.C.2d 930, recon. denied, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 93 (1984), vacated and remanded sub nom. Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 779 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Deregulation of Television, 98
F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984), clarified, 104 F.C.C.2d 358 (1986), aff'd in part, remanded in part, sub
nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding
much of the Commission's TV deregulation but remanding the issue dealing with guidelines
for children's programming).
14. For examples of recent FCC decisions increasing the autonomy of broadcast licensees,
see Broadcast Auxiliary Facility Sharing, 93 F.C.C.2d 570 (1983) (allowing licensees to lease
"excess capacity" on auxiliary services, such as studio-to-transmitter links or mobile news-
gathering telecommunications equipment); FM Subcarrier Authorizations, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1519 (1983) (removing nearly all restrictions on use of FM subcarriers for broadcast or
nonbroadcast purposes); Short Term Operation Without Prior Approval, 50 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1492 (1982) (permitting unlicensed operations of auxiliary broadcast facilities on a short
term basis without prior FCC approval under authority conveyed by the main broadcast li-
cense). See generally Gellhom, Deregulation: Delight of Delusion?, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 469
(1980) (elaborating on the many problems of regulation but concluding that regulation will
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and reduced direct governmental control over their affairs.' 5 While the
Commission lacks power to remove the basic statutory framework of the
public interest standard,' 6 the more autonomy the Commission grants to its
licensees the more its interpretation of the trusteeship model begins to re-
semble a pure marketplace approach. Because the 1934 Act embraced a
trusteeship model, not a pure marketplace model, the courts eventually
would be expected to find limits on the extent that the Commission can use
"market" mechanisms as a spectrum allocation alternative. If the Commis-
sion were to go so far as to remove all restrictions on a licensee's use of
spectrum, the "regulation" of spectrum in the public interest would begin to
resemble a granting of statutorily prohibited property interests.
17
None of the Commission's recent deregulatory initiatives, however, have
granted broadcast licensees the autonomy to decide to change the principal
use of Commission allocated spectrum from broadcasting to some other type
of telecommunications service.'" Historically, such a decision rests exclu-
sively with the Commission and cannot be changed at will by the licensee. 19
always be necessary unless society wishes to return to the "Law of the Jungle."); Webbink, The
Recent Deregulatory Movement at the FCC, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE U.S.: TRENDS
AND POLICIES 61 (L. Lewin ed. 1981) (discussing development of recent FCC deregulatory
policies); Note, The Proposed Communications Act Rewrite. Potomac Deregulatory Fever v.
The Public Interest, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 476 (1979) (analyzing proposed amendments to the
Communications Act of 1934 and finding none of them consistent with the author's view of the
public interest).
15. For examples of FCC decisions reducing direct government control over a licensee's
affairs, see Objectionable Loudness of Commercial Announcements, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
390 (1984) (terminating proceeding with decision not to issue regulations to control loudness
of commercials); Elimination of Routine Broadcast Logging Requirements, 54 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 805 (1983) (eliminating most logkeeping requirements deemed to be routine in nature);
Elimination of Annual Financial Report of Broadcast Stations, 51 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 135
(1982) (eliminating the requirement for broadcast licensees to annually report the financial
condition of their stations). See Gellhorn, supra note 14, at 469-70.
16. See United Church of Christ, 707 F.2d at 1443 (strongly suggesting that Congress is
the more appropriate body to undertake "significant deregulation"). But see Citizens Commu-
nications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (describing the difficulties of
seeking license renewal reform in Congress).
17. See infra notes 234-47 and accompanying text. Section 301 of the Communications
Act of 1934 provides for the use of radio spectrum, "but not the ownership thereof." 47
U.S.C. § 301.
18. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. Licensees do have discretion, however,
over communications services the Commission determines to be "subsidiary" or "secondary"
to the primary communications service using the spectrum allocation. In many instances, a
licensee can use its secondary communications capability for virtually any lawful purpose. See,
e.g., FM Subcarrier Communications Authorizations, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1519 (1983)
(use of inaudible FM subcarrier for nonbroadcast purposes); Use of the AM Carrier Signal,
100 F.C.C.2d 5 (1982) (use of inaudible tones for nonbroadcast purposes); see also infra notes
240-45 and accompanying text.
19. See R. SMALL, A COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE SPECTRUM REGULATORY AP-
19871
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Thus, the holder of a television license must engage in television broadcast-
ing and cannot switch to another type of service. However, the Commission
has promulgated an innovative proposal to establish a "flexible radio ser-
vice" that would, for the first time, permit licensees to unilaterally alter the
type of service provided in spectrum presently allocated for UHF television
broadcasting on channels 50-59.2" This proposal sets forth a new kind of
marketplace autonomy for spectrum users that challenges the limits of the
trusteeship model of radio spectrum allocation.2
This Comment analyzes the flexible radio service proposal and questions
whether, under such a system, spectrum users would, in fact, serve as trust-
ees of the public airwaves, or whether they would act more like owners of
spectrum in derogation of the trusteeship model. The Commission's propo-
sal raises several specific legal issues. First, a flexible radio service is prohib-
ited if it grants a property interest in spectrum.22 Second, implementation of
a flexible radio service raises troublesome issues of whether newcomers to
the broadcast spectrum would be afforded adequate opportunity to exercise
their statutory right to challenge incumbent licensees at the time of a change
in communication service.23 Finally, the proposal raises several practical
difficulties that, if not accommodated, could prejudice existing spectrum
users and pose significant administrative problems for the Commission.24
But beyond these difficulties, the integrity of the trusteeship model is at
PROACHEs 2 (Office of Science and Technology, Federal Communications Commission Report
No. 82-1, 1982). This report classifies spectrum regulation using a six-tier hierarchy: (1) inter-
national restrictions and applicable decisions; (2) government or nongovernment communica-
tions; (3) FCC spectrum use classification (for example, broadcast or common-carrier);
(4) FCC user classifications; (5) system design technical constraints; and (6) spectrum loading
standards. At issue in this commentary is the extent that market forces can determine spec-
trum use classification. See infra notes 159-210 and accompanying text.
20. See Further Sharing of the UHF Television Band by Private Land Mobile Radio Serv-
ices, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,587, 25,595-98 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 2) (proposed June 20,
1985), reprinted in 101 F.C.C.2d 852 (1985) [hereinafter UHF Notice]. UHF television cur-
rently occupies television channels 14-69 (470-806 MHz). 47 C.F.R. § 73.603(a) (1986); see
also Spectrum for Land Mobile Services, 19 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1663 (1970) (reallocating
806-890 MHz (formerly UHF channels 70-83) for use by land mobile communications serv-
ices); Land Mobile Spectrum Allocations, 23 F.C.C.2d 325 (1970) (permitting land mobile
communications services to "share" UHF channels 14-20 within 50 miles of the 10 largest
markets); Engineering Standards Concerning the Television Broadcast Service, 41 F.C.C. 148,
154-58 (1952) (allocating 470-890 MHz (channels 14-83) for use by UHF television); infra
notes 122-53 and accompanying text.
21. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
22. See 47 U.S.C. § 301; see also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475
(1940) ("The policy of the Act is clear that no person is to have anything in the nature of a
property right as a result of the granting of a license."); infra notes 234-47 and accompanying
text.
23. See infra notes 248-61 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 283-91 and accompanying text.
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stake; the model will mean little if, as a practical matter, the actions of licen-
sees are not subject to any type of government approval.25 However, since
today's telecommunications world differs considerably from the one encoun-
tered by the drafters of the 1934 Act, the establishment of a flexible radio
service may solve several of the acknowledged problems associated with the
current system of spectrum allocation.26
This Comment first examines whether the Commission has the statutory
authority to establish a flexible radio service. It begins by briefly describing
the history of the current FCC allocation policies and the statutory frame-
work of Commission spectrum allocation decisions. It then discusses previ-
ously proposed systems of spectrum "markets" and compares them with the
Commission's current proposal. Against this background, this Comment
analyzes the flexible radio service and studies the legal questions posed by its
implementation. Specifically, the proposal may transgress the spirit, if not
the letter, of the trusteeship model established by the 1934 Act. This Com-
ment concludes that the Commission should either abandon its proposal or
obtain clarifying statutory authority from Congress allowing the Commis-
sion to inaugurate a flexible radio service.
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF SPECTRUM ALLOCATION DECISIONS
A. Statutory History and the Public Interest Standard
Government allocation of radio frequency spectrum began when Congress
enacted the Radio Act of 1912.27 Congress responded to widespread techni-
cal interference problems2" that had arisen among mutually exclusive gov-
ernment, commercial, and amateur uses of spectrum.29 The Secretary of
25. See id.; Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d
1413, 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
26. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
27. Act of Aug. 13, 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302, repealed by Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44
Stat. 1174, repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102.
An even earlier act, the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1910, ch. 379, 36 Stat. 629, did not allocate
spectrum at all but merely required ocean going ships to possess radio transmitting apparatus.
See generally J. Robinson, Spectrum Management Policy in the United States: An Historical
Account (Federal Communications Commission Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper
No. 15, 1985) (analyzing the various problems inherent in the current system of frequency
allocation).
28. When two or more radio transmitters use the same frequency at the same time, inter-
ference will be perceived on that frequency by a radio receiver capable of hearing both stations.
Neither station will be heard satisfactorily. Alleviating radio interference is a principal justifi-
cation for the regulation of broadcasting. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 376 (1969); see also M. Mueller, supra note 2, at 8-9.
29. See J. Robinson, supra note 27, at 10, 12-14. The uses of spectrum at this time were
largely for telegraph and morse code purposes. The technology of voice communications was
19871
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Commerce granted the first radio broadcast licenses in the early 1920's pur-
suant to the 1912 Act. 3' As commercial radio broadcasting developed, the
demand soon exceeded the supply of available frequencies. 31 The Secretary
had no power, however, to deny an application to use a radio frequency and
consequently a serious overcrowding condition arose.3 2 On-air radio sta-
tions interfered with each other at will.33 Congress recognized that new leg-
islation was required to assure the orderly and interference-free development
of commercial radio broadcasting.34
Congress subsequently enacted the Radio Act of 1927,"5 largely to solve
the problem of widespread interference caused by the proliferation of com-
mercial radio broadcasts.36 The 1927 Act created a Federal Radio Commis-
sion (FRC) with the power to assign frequencies, classify stations, prescribe
service and reduce interference.3 7 The FRC was to exercise these powers as
the "public convenience, interest, or necessity" required.31 In 1934, Con-
gress enacted the Communications Act of 1934 largely to consolidate regula-
tion over all forms of communication.39
still in the process of development. See S. REP. No. 698, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1912); see also
Metzger & Burrus, Radio Frequency Allocation in the Public Interest: Federal Government and
Civilian Use, 4 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1965-66).
30. Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, §§ 1-2, 37 Stat. 302-03.
31. Initially, only two frequencies were allocated to support what became several hundred
stations. See Metzger & Burrus, supra note 29, at 5.
32. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923). All the Secretary
could do was assign frequencies thought to cause the least amount of interference. Id. at 1007;
see also Metzger & Burrus, supra note 29, at 7; J. Robinson, supra note 27, at 17.
33. See Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcON. 1, 5 (1959). In
United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926), the court held that the
Secretary of Commerce was without authority to penalize stations that refused to operate on
their assigned frequencies. Id. at 618. Thus, following Zenith, the Secretary of Commerce lost
all regulatory power. See Metzger & Burrus, supra note 29, at 7-8; Note, The Crisis in Electro-
magnetic Frequency Allocation: Abatement Through Market Distribution, 53 IOWA L. REV,
437, 449 (1967).
34. See J. Robinson, supra note 27, at 17-21.
35. Ch. 169, § 6, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,
§ 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 70-79 (1986)).
36. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943); see also
Metzger & Burrus, supra note 29, at 9-12.
37. Radio Act of 1927, §§ 3-4, 6; see also Metzger & Burrus, supra note 29, at 10. Gov-
ernment owned and operated stations were exempt from FRC regulation. See Radio Act of
1927, § 6.
38. Radio Act of 1927, §§ 4, 9, 11, 21. See generally Caldwell, The Standard of Public
Interest, Convenience or Necessity as Used in the Radio Act of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295, 301-02
(1930) (analyzing the phrase "public interest, convenience, and necessity").
39. See Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-610 (1982)); Robinson, Radio Spectrum Regulation: The Administrative Process and
the Problems of Institutional Reform, 53 MINN. L. REV. 1179, 1182-83 (1969). The 1927 Act
did not apply to stations owned by the government. At the time, wire communications-
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The 1934 Act established the Federal Communications Commission and
incorporated virtually all of the 1927 Act's regulatory structure as it per-
tained to regulation of radio broadcasting.' The Act empowers the Com-
mission to control the use of radio spectrum 4 1 and to license radio stations in
the "public convenience, interest, or necessity,"42 for limited periods of
time,4 a such that the Commission may provide a "fair, efficient and equitable
distribution of radio service" 44 for all "communities."4 5 Because licenses to
use radio spectrum are granted only for limited time periods, 46 broadcast
licensees are required periodically to apply for renewal of the license. Re-
newal applications may be granted if the "public interest" is served.4 7 The
Act permits interested parties to file petitions to deny an incumbent's appli-
cation for license renewal and to urge the Commission to find that a grant of
a renewal application would not serve the public interest.48
The Supreme Court broadly approved the trusteeship model of spectrum
regulation in the landmark case of NBC v. United States.49 The Supreme
telephone and telegraph-were administered by the Postmaster General. See S. REP. No. 781,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
40. See Metzger & Burrus, supra note 29, at 13; Robinson, supra note 39, at 1183. In
1982, Congress reduced the number of Commissioners from seven to five. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-253, § 501, 96 Stat. 805 (1982) (amending 47
U.S.C. § 154 (1982)).
41. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1982) (providing for the Commission to "maintain the control ...
over all channels of radio transmission"), see supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
42. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a).
43. Id. § 307(c).
44. Id. § 307(b).
45. Id. The appropriate definition of "community" is somewhat controversial. See FCC,
REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE AM BROADCAST RULES 40-44 (1986); see also Suburban
Community Policy, 93 F.C.C.2d 436, 437 (1982) (eliminating the so-called "Berwick" doctrine
and "de facto reallocation" policies that had been designed to deter FM radio stations from de
facto changing their community of license by changing the location of the station's transmit-
ter). The Commission believes that § 307(b) is applicable only to broadcast stations. See An-
sweRite Professional Telephone Service, 68 F.C.C.2d 1473, 1476 (1977) (rejecting contention
that the § 307(b) "fair, efficient and equitable distribution" requirement prevents Commission
from assigning two frequencies for paging service to a smaller community than a community
assigned only one paging frequency); Orange County Radiotelephone Service, 5 F.C.C.2d 848,
850 (1966) (majority of Commission determines that the legislative history of § 307(b) demon-
strates that the section only applies to broadcast service).
46. 47 U.S.C. § 307(c). In 1981, Congress amended the 1934 Act to specify five-year
renewal terms for television stations and seven-year terms for radio. Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1241, 95 Stat. 736 (1981).
47. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a).
48. Id. § 309(d); see also Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
49. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The National Broadcasting Company (NBC) challenged the
Commission's authority to regulate radio broadcast networks. As program suppliers to li-
censed radio stations, networks were not directly licensed themselves. Id. at 193-98, 209-10.
1987]
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Court affirmed the FCC's authority to bring radio broadcast networks
within the umbrella of FCC jurisdiction.5" The Court held that the 1934
Act confers broad power upon the FCC to regulate broadcasters in the pub-
lic interest. 5' Relying on the oft-cited and sometimes criticized "scarcity"
rationale, the Court reasoned that government regulation is justified because
the electromagnetic spectrum can support only a limited number of users.5 2
While Congress has amended the 1934 Act on several occasions,5 3 the trus-
teeship model upheld in NBC, with its fundamental prescription for the FCC
to allocate spectrum and license stations in the public convenience, interest,
or necessity, remained unchanged.
54
The public interest standard confers broad discretion on the Commission
to regulate the frequencies used for broadcasting.55 In NBC, the Court re-
50. Id. at 224.
51. Id. at 219. The Court used the dynamic aspects of radio technology to justify provi-
sions of a broad mandate to foster radio development yet assure service in the public interest.
Id.
52. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); CBS v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101, 103-14 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969); NBC, 319 U.S. at 212-13, 226. But the scarcity rationale
has increasingly been criticized, and there are indications that its formerly immutable charac-
ter may be changing. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.ll (1984)
(implying that a "revision" of the system of broadcast regulation might be entertained with
"[s]ome signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced");
see also Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 221-26; M. Mueller, supra note 2, at 6-12; Rossini,
The Spectrum Scarcity Doctrine: A Constitutional Anachronism, 39 Sw. L.J. 827, 827-43
(1985).
53. Recent substantive amendments to title III of the 1934 Act include the Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, §§ 1-9, 98 Stat. 2780 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (Supp. III 1985)) (updates the 1934 Act to establish a na-
tional policy on cable television); Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
259, § 108, 96 Stat. 1091 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982)) (grants FCC
authority to establish interference rejection standards for electronic home entertainment equip-
ment); and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, ch. 2, § 1241,
95 Stat. 736 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1982)) (extends license terms for radio and televi-
sion stations).
54. See CBS, 412 U.S. at 94; Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375-86. Section 303 of the 1934 Act
provides that "the Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity
requires, shall ... (c) Assign bands of frequencies to the various classes of stations, and assign
frequencies for each individual station and determine the power which each station shall use
and the time during which it may operate." 47 U.S.C. § 303. For example, the FCC has
allocated 88-108 MHz for FM Broadcasting. 47 C.F.R. § 73.201 (1986). For a review of the
Commission's allocation system for VHF television, see Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the
Entry of Additional Television Networks: The Federal Communications Commission's Spec-
trum Management Policies, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 875 (1981).
55. Such discretion applies not only to decisions that establish channels of communica-
tion, but also to the material communicated on those channels. See United States v. Midwest
Video, 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968);
NBC, 319 U.S. at 215-16 ("The Act does not restrict the Commission merely to supervision of
[Vol. 37:149
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jected the contention that the public interest standard is sufficiently vague to
be an unconstitutional delegation of power.5 6 The meaning of the standard
in a particular case will depend on the nature and importance of relevant
factors.5 7 Thus, spectrum allocation decisions in the public interest are not
intended for the benefit of licensees but are supposed to benefit the listening
and viewing public.5
B. Nature of Spectrum Allocation Decisions
Congress has delegated to the Commission the authority to decide the
specific radio frequencies on which particular communications services will
operate."9 The Commission makes these decisions by using informal
rulemaking proceedings under authority of the 1934 Act.60
the traffic. It puts upon the Commission the burden of determining the composition of that
traffic .. "); National Ass'n of Indep. TV Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 502 F.2d 249, 256-
58 (2d Cir. 1974) (FCC, in making public interest determinations, must place the public inter-
est above private interests, and may not simply "compromise" among proceeding partici-
pants); see also J. Robinson, supra note 27, at 42-43; Chamberlin, Lessons in Regulating
Information Flow.: The FCC's Weak Track Record in Interpreting the Public Interest Standard,
60 N.C.L. REV. 1057 (1982); Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 215-16; Krugman & Reid,
The Public Interest as Defined by FCC Policymakers, 24 J. BROADCASTING 311 (1980); Robin-
son, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L.
REV. 169, 174 (1978) ("a grant of plenary power to the FCC to regulate electronic communi-
cations as it deems it appropriate").
56. NBC, 319 U.S. at 190.
57. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); FCC v. Pottsville Broad-
casting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) ("While [the public interest standard] is as concrete as
the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit, it serves as a
supple instrument for the exercise of discretion ...."); see Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson
Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933) (public interest standard must be inter-
preted within context of factual and policy issues); Radio Relay Corp. v. FCC, 409 F.2d 322,
326 (2d Cir. 1969). As to the limits of the Commission's substantive discretion, it appears that
the FCC's power can be expanded to suit the agency's purpose, even if such a purpose is not
articulated in the Act. See Midwest Video, 406 U.S. at 649; Robinson, supra note 55, at 174.
See generally Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157 (sustaining jurisdiction of the Commission over
cable television systems, at least to the extent "reasonably ancillary to the effective perform-
ance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcast-
ing"); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (FCC has
discretion "to select the policies deemed to be in the public interest"), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971).
58. The Supreme Court has said that the public interest to be served is the interest of the
listening public in the "larger and more effective use of radio." NBC, 319 U.S. at 216 (citing
47 U.S.C. § 303(g)); see also Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 267-68
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
59. 47 U.S.C. § 303.
60. The Commission may make such rules it believes necessary to implement the provi-
sions of the 1934 Act, and has a great deal of discretion to adopt whatever procedures it deems
most efficient. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(j), 303(r), 403; see also United States v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (upholding power of Commission to establish rules that
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Under the so-called "block" allocations system6 the FCC estimates the
appropriate amount of spectrum for a specific communications service and
allocates a block of frequencies for that service's use.62 These decisions are
based on the FCC's assessment of the public's need for particular communi-
cations services," the location in the spectrum most technically suitable for
a particular radio service, ' and the degree to which the technology em-
ployed may cause or receive undue interference. 65 In addition, allocation
rulemaking proceedings frequently contain complex procedural issues ad-
dressing the methods the FCC proposes to use in licensing individual
applicants.6 6
For a variety of reasons, spectrum allocation proceedings are often contro-
characterize the scope of § 309(b) hearing requirements); Chisolm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 364-
66 (D.C. Cir.) (citing CBS v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971)) (FCC may overrule
prior statute interpretations or reverse its own policy where it provides "an opinion or analysis
indicating that the standard is being changed and not ignored, and assuring that it is faithful
and not indifferent to the rule of law."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). Courts have held
that rulemaking pursuant to § 303(r) is subject to the requirements of § 4 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1982). See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567
F.2d 9, 34-35 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Specifically, members of the public must be afforded notice, an
opportunity for comment, and a rationale for adoption of the final rules. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(c). Section 402 of the 1934 Act as amended provides for appeals to the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals from adverse Commission decisions. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b).
The applicable standard of review is contained in § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) ("arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion"). For a discussion of the
§ 706 standard of review, see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
416 (1971) ("Although this [court's] inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the
ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency."); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 33-37 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (a
court reviewing agency action must affirm if a rational basis to the agency decision can be
discerned).
61. See M. Mueller, supra note 2, at 13-14; J. Robinson, supra note 27, at 44.
62. See M. Mueller, supra note 2, at 13-16; J. Robinson, supra note 27, at 42-52; see also
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ECONOMIC
TECHNIQUES FOR SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT, ch. II, at 2-5 (1979) [hereinafter, MATHTEC
STUDY].
63. J. Robinson, supra note 27, at 47-50.
64. Id. at 50-52.
65. M. Mueller, supra note 2, at 14; J. Robinson, supra note 27, at 50-52.
66. On the complexity and difficulty of FCC decisionmaking in these proceedings, see
Jones, Use and Regulation of the Radio Spectrum: Report on a Conference, 1968 WASH.
U.L.Q. 71, 75-78; MATHTEC STUDY, supra note 62, ch. II, at 5-16; Metzger & Burrus, supra
note 29; M. Mueller, supra note 2, at 13-16; J. Robinson, supra note 27, at 53-55; Note, supra
note 33, at 472; see also Gross v. FCC, 480 F.2d 1288, 1292 n.7 (2d Cir. 1973) (Commission
may prescribe the use of frequencies based on the purpose and nature of the transmission as
well as technical considerations). FCC allocation proceedings may also change an existing
allocation scheme or technical standards. Such a change, for example, could either permit
additional licenses to be established, or permit "sharing" of spectrum between two or more
communications services. Compare 9 kHz AM Allocations, 88 F.C.C.2d 290 (1981) (if ap-
proved, would have created many more AM stations by reducing AM channel spacing from
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versial. 67 First, the public interest standard used by the Commission to
make decisions is interpreted subjectively. 6 Thus, rulemaking participants
often interpret application of this standard differently, giving rise to signifi-
cant controversy in the proceedings.69 Second, for some spectrum users the
quantity of spectrum made available by the Commission will determine the
size and profitability of their industry.7° Finally, other spectrum users, par-
ticularly radio and television broadcasters, view spectrum allocation pro-
ceedings as potentially bringing the risks of new interference, 7 added
competition, 72 or both to compromise their communications services.73 In
combination, these factors render spectrum allocation proceedings very
complex and controversial.
Many commentators have criticized the current system of block alloca-
tions.74 Among the identified problems with the current system are that it
10kHz to 9kHz) with UHF Spectrum Sharing, 23 F.C.C.2d 325 (1970) (providing for limited
frequency sharing between UHF broadcasting and land mobile communication).
67. See generally Parkman, The FCC's Allocation of Television Licenses: Regulation with
Inadequate Information, 46 ALB. L. REV. 22 (1981); Rosenblum, Low Visibility Decision-Mak-
ing by Administrative Agencies.: The Problem of Radio Spectrum Allocations, 18 ADMIN. L.
REV. 19 (1965).
68. Johnson, Towers of Babel: The Chaos in Radio Spectrum Utilization and Allocation,
34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 505, 516-19 (1969); J. Robinson, supra note 27, at 42-44.
69. See M. Mueller, supra note 2, at 13-16; J. Robinson, supra note 27, at 44-47. An
example of the kinds of decisions the FCC can be called upon to make is shown in Lehigh
Cooperative Farmers, Inc., 10 F.C.C.2d 315 (1967). The FCC relegated the applicant to the
less desirable business radio service, rather than the special industrial radio service, on the
grounds that a livestock breeding business is of higher priority than the dairy inspection busi-
ness. Id. at 316.
70. In the land mobile communications industry, for example, the more spectrum made
available the more radio communications systems can be sold. See J. Robinson, supra note 27,
at 53-54. Further, to a large extent the future sales of mobile radio equipment depend on
obtaining increased spectrum. See id.; infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,587, 25,590; Availability of FM Stations,
94 F.C.C.2d 152 (1983) (reduced station separation mileage requirements would create more
stations and more interference), reconsideration granted in part, 97 F.C.C.2d 279 (1984); 9 kHz
AM Allocations, 88 F.C.C.2d 290 (1981) (if approved, would have created more AM stations
at the expense of increased interference). In effect, new interference reduces the useful service
areas of broadcast stations thus diminishing the quality of service to existing viewers and lis-
teners or perhaps precluding service altogether. See id. at 305-08.
72. See generally Planning of Broadcasting in the 1605-1705 kHz Band, 50 Fed. Reg.
33,844 (1985) (first report discussing U.S. proposals for additional AM broadcasting in the
1605-1705 kHz frequency band). Added competition may hurt existing broadcasters by estab-
lishing more radio stations to compete for available advertising dollars. See Fowler & Brenner,
supra note 9, at 231-33.
73. Availability of FM Stations, 94 F.C.C.2d at 157, 164-70; 9kHz AM Allocations, 88
F.C.C.2d at 296-98, 305-08.
74. See Jones, supra note 66, at 81, 100-01 (block allocations produce uncertainty over the
"true value" of spectrum; Commission has consistently failed to articulate criteria for spec-
trum allocation decisions); J. Robinson, supra note 27, at 42-52 (existing allocations process
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(1) fails to allocate spectrum efficiently,7 5 (2) remains inflexible in the face of
changing technology, 76 (3) deters spectrum-efficient research and develop-
ment, 7 7 (4) creates complex and difficult issues that, due to a lack of ade-
quate resources, prevent the Commission from making effective decisions,78
(5) relies on an excessively vague public interest decisionmaking standard, 79
and (6) precludes adequate long range planning. 0 As a result, commenta-
tors have proposed alternative spectrum management systems designed to
remedy these infirmities.8 ' The flexible radio service proposal offered by the
Commission is one such alternative. It would use market forces to bring
flexibility to the Commission's rigid block allocations system. In some re-
spects, inaugurating a flexible radio service is a step toward establishing an
alternative "market forces" method of allocating spectrum. However, the
extent to which the Commission may rely on market forces to attain public
interest goals within the 1934 Act is not clear, and the applicable law re-
mains unsettled. 2
C. Role of Market Forces
One of the key premises of the flexible radio service proposal is the Com-
mission's desire to interject market forces into its decisions as to which par-
ticular communications services are entitled to use designated radio
fails to efficiently allocate spectrum); see also PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNICA-
TIONS POLICY, FINAL REPORT, ch. 8, at 15-16 (1968) [hereinafter TASK FORCE FINAL RE-
PORT]; Johnson, supra note 68, at 509-18; Robinson, supra note 55, at 169; Note, supra note
33, at 461-64; M. Mueller, supra note 2, at 13-16.
75. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 509-15 (policymakers differ on the meaning of "spec-
trum efficiency"); J. Robinson, supra note 27, at 42-52; see also infra note 185 and accompany-
ing text.
76. Jones, supra note 66, at 81, 100-01.
77. Id. at 82-83.
78. Johnson, supra note 68, at 515-16; Robinson, supra note 55, at 216-24; Note, supra
note 33, at 464; M. Mueller, supra note 2, at 13-15.
79. See Geller, A Modest Proposal for Modest Reform of the Federal Communications
Commission, 63 GEO. L.J. 705, 715-18 (1975) (political or other biases often permeate FCC
decisions, leading to heavy role for Commissioner's preferences); Johnson, supra note 68, at
517. See generally Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Defini-
tion of Administrative Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 863, 1055, 1263 (1962); J. Robinson,
supra note 27, at 42-44.
80. Johnson, supra note 68, at 517; Note, supra note 33, at 463.
81. See infra notes 159-73 and accompanying text. To date, however, none have been
authorized by statute. The current Commission has accepted many of the commentators' criti-
cisms and responded by advocating the use of "market forces" as a regulatory tool wherever
feasible, believing that markets make better decisions than FCC Commissioners. Cf Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 239-40.
82. See infra notes 83-117 and accompanying text.
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spectrum.83 While recent Commission decisions evince a preference for the
use of market forces in lieu of regulation,84 there are limits on the degree to
which the Commission may rely on market forces exclusively, in lieu of reg-
ulation, in making public interest determinations.85 Several court decisions
have addressed these issues.
In FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 86 a station owner objected to the
entry of a new broadcast station in its city of license by alleging that local
advertising revenues could not support an additional radio station. 87 The
Supreme Court refused to consider the station owner's argument and con-
cluded that economic injury to an existing station is not a "separate and
independent" factor for the Commission to consider when passing on the
merits of a license applicant.8 8 The Court stated that it is not the Commis-
sion's function to grant monopolies8 9 or to protect incumbent licensees,9 °
but to protect the listening public.9 ' The Court, however, did not forbid the
Commission from considering competitive impacts; if the incumbent licen-
see's arguments proved true, both stations might not survive and the public
would be deprived of radio service.92 The Court determined that competi-
tive economic injury to a radio station is not an element that, without more,
should unduly influence the Commission's decision when passing on the
merits of a broadcast license application. 93
83. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
84. Id.; see infra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
85. See United Church of Christ, 707 F.2d at 1443.
86. 309 U.S. 470, reh'g denied, 309 U.S. 642 (1940).
87. Id. at 471.
88. Id. at 476.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 475.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 476. Fowler & Brenner argue, supra note 9, at 234, that the market to be
concerned with is the market for advertising dollars, and thus, if the Court were to remain true
to its logic, the Commission should properly be concerned with the influence of billboards,
newspapers and other media. Cf West Mich. Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 883 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (cessation of existing service is a matter affecting the public interest).
93. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473 (1940). See generally Carroll
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d. 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (establishing the so-called "Carroll
doctrine" by which existing licensees could challenge the grant of a new license in their com-
munity by bearing the "heavy burden" to prove that service to the public would be harmed in
a way that is detrimental to the public interest). The criteria necessary to make a Carroll
showing includes an estimate of the revenue potential of the market, and whether a new loss in
public service programming for the market would occur. See WLVA, Inc. v. FCC, 459 F.2d
1286, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Recently, the Commission has initiated a proceeding to consider
"abolishing certain policies that address the issue of economic injury to existing broadcast
stations." Notice of Inquiry, 2 FCC Rcd 3134, 3134 (1987). In a review of over 80 cases, the
Commission found no instance of a successful Carroll claim. Id. at 3135.
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The Court again considered the proper role of competition in determining
the public interest in FCC v. RCA Communications,94 holding that competi-
tion alone does not necessarily further the public convenience, interest, or
necessity. 5 The FCC had authorized the Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co.
to construct radio telegraph facilities in Portugal and the Netherlands that
would duplicate and compete with virtually identical existing facilities oper-
ated by RCA. 96 The Court disagreed with the Commission's finding that a
national policy in favor of competition existed and would be furthered by
authorization of duplicate facilities.97 The Commission reasoned that such a
national policy dictated establishing competition wherever "reasonably feasi-
ble." 98 The Court criticized the Commission's determination, holding it im-
proper for public interest determinations to be based solely on competitive
considerations.99 Indeed, the Court cited the very existence of the 1934 Act
as evidence that Congress did not intend for competition alone to guide
Commission decisions. 100
RCA and Sanders Bros. permit the FCC to consider competition as a fac-
tor in public interest policy making, as long as competition or its absence is
not the single overriding principle directing the FCC's activity.' 0 ' The
Commission must articulate a reasonable expectation of some other benefi-
cial effect, such as service improvement, in which to ground its decisions.' 2
A mere conclusory faith in the benefits of competition is not enough. 103 In
neither case, however, did the Court deal with the market forces deregu-
latory rationale that underlies the Commission's proposed flexible radio ser-
vice. This rationale has more significant implications. Its essence is that a
minimization of Commission oversight and reliance on market forces will
itself achieve public interest goals. "0
94. 346 U.S. 86 (1953); see also Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (FCC cannot "automatically equate the public interest with additional competition").
95. 346 U.S. at 96-97.
96. Id. at 88-89.
97. Id. at 89, 91.
98. Id. at 89.
99. Id. at 90-95.
100. Id. at 93.
101. See FCC v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86, 93 (1953); FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473 (1940); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 777 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
102. RCA, 346 U.S. at 97.
103. Id.; see also Hawaiian Tel., 498 F.2d at 777.
104. Although the meaning of the terms "competition" and "market forces" may at first
blush appear the same, upon closer inspection they are different. "Competition" appears to
characterize a regulatory tool used to achieve previously articulated public interest purposes.
See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 230-36. "Market forces," on the other hand, refers to a
means by which the public may directly influence communications policy by removing the
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In 1976, the Commission invoked the market forces rationale to deregu-
late radio station program formats."' 5 The Commission concluded in a pol-
icy statement that the public interest is best served when market forces and
competition among broadcasters guide format choices. 106 The Commission
decided to allow market forces, rather than predetermined regulatory guide-
lines, to control the amount and content of radio station program formats. 11
7
In FCC v. WNCN Listener's Guild, 10 8 listener groups wishing to preserve a
particular radio format challenged the FCC's policy statement.109 The
Supreme Court refused to overturn the FCC's policy statement," 0 and ac-
cepted the FCC's conclusion that, even after a full evidentiary hearing, there
would be no assurance that the FCC's decision would be any more suitable
to disgruntled listeners than a decision by station management."' The
Court unanimously agreed that the decision of whether to use market princi-
ples rests within the FCC's competence to assess the radio broadcast market
and likely licensee behavior." 1
2
Commission as an interpreter of the public interest. See id. at 210-11 ("the public's interest,
then, defines the public interest"). The difference appears to be in who defines and articulates
the public interest: the public itself, or the Commission. For better or worse, the 1934 Act
appears to settle this question in favor of the Commission. Put differently, the Act requires the
Commission to regulate "in the public interest." The issue presented by the Commission's
market forces rationale is whether the Act permits the Commission to, in essence, define the
public interest to be virtually no regulation at all. RCA and Sanders Brothers refer to the role
of competition, not the use of market forces. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
This distinction is important because, in a sense, the tug of war between the trusteeship model
and marketplace models of regulation is a battle for the power to define the public interest.
105. See In re Development of Policy Re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of
Broadcast Stations [hereinafter Entertainment Formats], 60 F.C.C.2d 848 (1976) (mem.), re-
consideration denied, 66 F.C.C.2d 78 (1977).
106. See In re Development of Policy Re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of
Broadcast Stations, 57 F.C.C.2d 580 (1976), ordered, 60 F.C.C.2d 848 (1976) (mem.), reconsid-
eration denied, 66 F.C.C.2d 78 (1977); see also Entertainment Formats, supra note 105, at 863-
65.
107. See Entertainment Formats, supra note 105, at 863-65.
108. 450 U.S. 582 (1981). There is a great deal of literature on the WNCN case. See, e.g.,
Note, The End of the Format Doctrine-Public Hearings on Changes in Entertainment Formats
Need not be Held in Conjunction with Applications to Transfer or Renew Radio Broadcast
Licenses: FCC v. WNCN Listener's Guild, 450 US. 582 (1981), 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
569 (1982).
109. See WNCN, 450 U.S. at 585-86.
110. Id. at 603.
111. Id. at 595-96.
112. Id. at 608 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, objected
only that the FCC's policy statement lacked a safety valve procedure to instill some flexibility
in an otherwise rigid general policy. Id. at 620 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent believed
that the need for a "safety valve" feature should be especially strong where the Commission's
forecast that its policies promote the public interest is based solely on predictions and inher-
ently lacks factual support. Id. at 611 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The Commission has also applied the market forces principle in a variety
of other deregulatory contexts. For example, the Commission chose to rely
on market forces to supply adequate children's television programming, 113
and it reduced or eliminated many of the regulatory requirements governing
broadcast station programming." 4 Although WNCN endorsed the use of
market forces in FCC programming determinations, it remains questionable
whether the market concept can be extended to basic frequency and spec-
trum use determinations. Even if spectrum is first allocated by the Commis-
sion, it is questionable whether WNCN's rationale permits licensees to
choose the type of fundamental communications services provided.' ' Per-
haps most significant, the 1934 Act does not specifically require the Com-
mission to regulate and determine program formats while it does explicitly
require the Commission to allocate frequencies and prescribe service." 6 To
date, the Commission has not applied its market forces rationale to questions
involving the primary allocation and use of radio spectrum." 7 It is the
113. See Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices, 96 F.C.C.2d 634,
aff'd sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 756 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
114. Specifically, the Commission (1) deleted quantitative guidelines encouraging radio
licensees to present certain amounts of news or public affairs programming, (2) eliminated the
so-called "ascertainment" process that required licensees to affirmatively discover the pro-
gramming needs and interests of their community of license, (3) removed regulations limiting
the amount of time the licensee could devote to commercials, and (4) deleted the requirement
that radio stations keep "logs" of the programming that is broadcast. See Deregulation of
Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, reconsideration granted in part, 87 F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), aff'd in part,
remanded in part sub nom. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir, 1983), on remand sub nom. Deregulation of Radio, 96 F.C.C.2d 930
(responding to court decision and establishing requirements to keep a minimum quarterly is-
sues list and programming responsive to those issues), reconsideration denied, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 93 (1984), vacated and remanded sub nom. Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 779 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Deregulation of Television,
98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984); cf Campbell, The FCC's Proposal to Deregulate Radio. Is It Permis-
sible Under the Communications Act of 1934 32 FED. COM. L.J. 233 (1980).
115. See Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1181, 1185
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (in affirming FCC decision to eliminate "regulatory underbrush" policies, the
court interpreted WNCN and United Church of Christ narrowly to mean that the Commission
may rely upon marketplace forces where it finds that a "market approach offers the best means
of controlling [broadcast] abuse.").
116. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1982). The issue of program formats arises in the context of
determining the "public interest" in license renewal proceedings. WNCN, 450 U.S. at 584. In
WNCN, the Supreme Court treated the program format change as one issue among many the
Commission must weigh in reviewing and granting licenses in the public interest. 450 U.S. at
600. The Court noted that broadcasters have no obligation to obtain prior government ap-
proval to change formats. Id.
117. The Commission, however, has permitted broadcast licensees almost complete discre-
tion in determining the nature of communication services that are supplied on channels that
are subsidiary to the primary broadcast signals. See infra notes 239-47 and accompanying
text.
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Commission's proposal for a flexible radio service that, for the first time,
raises this issue.
D. Development of the Flexible Radio Service Proposal
Two principal criticisms of the Commission's allocations process are that
it neither satisfactorily responds to changing societal needs nor sufficiently
accommodates the development of new technologies."' The flexible radio
service proposal is tailored to meet these drawbacks by granting significantly
increased autonomy to licensees." 9 The proposal would establish a block
allocation specifically for a flexible radio service. 12' For the first time, the
Commission would establish a market in the use of radio frequency spec-
trum initially allocated for broadcasting.'
2
'
The basic ideas and rationale of a flexible radio service were first articu-
lated in a September, 1983 report prepared by the Commission's Office of
Plans and Policy. 122 Responding to criticisms that FCC centralized block
allocations planning was slow to change and unable to accommodate chang-
ing technology, 123 the Plans and Policy Report proposed that the Commis-
sion establish a decentralized flexible radio service with only minimum
controls to define and prevent interference. 124 The Report recommended
experimentation with a flexible radio service in UHF television spectrum,
118. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 210-12. See generally FCC OFFICE OF PLANS
AND POLICY, A FRAMEWORK FOR A DECENTRALIZED RADIO SERVICE, (1983) [hereinafter
PLANS AND POLICY REPORT]; M. Mueller, supra note 2.
119. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
120. Only the spectrum proposed by the Commission for a flexible service-UHF televi-
sion channels 50-59-would be eligible to host flexible licensees. Id.
121. Id. Recently, the Commission has applied the "flexible use" principal in two addi-
tional contexts. In Land Mobile Reserve Bands, 2 FCC Rcd 1825 (1986), the Commission,
among other things, allocated 2 MHz of spectrum at 901-902 MHz and 940-941 MHz for a
"general purpose mobile radio service." Id. While the Commission allocated these frequencies
exclusively for mobile purposes, individual licensees are given the authority to make decisions
as to service details and system design. Id. at 1838. The Commission rejected arguments that
establishment of a general purpose mobile service is prohibited by the 1934 Act §§ 303(a)-(c),
307(b). Id. at 1839-40. In Flexible Allocations in the Domestic Public Land Mobile Service, 2
FCC Rcd 2795 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 22) (proposed April 23, 1987), the Commission
proposed several complex changes to the frequency allocations for mobile common-carriers to
make the existing allocations "more flexible and thus more able to respond to changes in mar-
ket demand." 2 FCC Rcd at 2795.
122. PLANS AND POLICY REPORT, supra note 118.
123. Id. at 1.
124. Id. at 1-4. There is a limit, however, on the extent to which the Commission can
function merely as a "traffic cop" of the airwaves. In the NBC case, the Court was explicit in
interpreting the 1934 Act to require the Commission to be much more; the Commission has
the added burden of determining "the composition of [the] traffic." NBC v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
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thus foreshadowing the current proposal.125 On May 31, 1985, the Commis-
sion adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking containing a specific propo-
sal for a flexible radio service in UHF television spectrum (UHF Notice).'26
The Commission initiated the flexible radio proposal; it was not prompted
by a public petition. 127 The proposal supplements the UHF Notice as part
of a broader issue of allocating spectrum among UHF television stations and
two-way land mobile communications. 128 For over twenty years, the land
mobile industry has requested a greater number of frequencies for provision
of land mobile services.' 2 9 The principal rationale is that because suitable
frequencies have not otherwise been available, land mobile has sought the
reallocation of spectrum presently used by the UHF television service. 3 '
The UHF Notice is a partial response by the Commission to the pressure of
the land mobile industry to reallocate UHF spectrum for land mobile
purposes. 3'
To some extent, the land mobile industry has succeeded in its efforts to
reallocate UHF spectrum.' 32 In 1970, the Commission allocated spectrum
125. See PLANS AND POLICY REPORT, supra note 118, at 52. This report reviews earlier
government studies on the problems of spectrum allocation, and articulates some of the bene-
fits of introducing more flexibility into spectrum usage decisions. Id. at 5-12. The Commission
is urged to begin a rulemaking proceeding to explore the issues raised by a flexible radio ser-
vice. Id. at 53. See generally R. SMALL, supra note 19 (reviewing the pros and cons of the
existing system of allocating spectrum and offering several alternative approaches).
126. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595-98.
127. Id. at 25,595.
128. Id. The Land Mobile Communications Service (Land Mobile), is regulated under 47
C.F.R. pts. 21, 90 (1986). Part 90 regulates Private Land Mobile Services, for example, taxis,
delivery services, and repair services. Part 21 regulates Public Land Mobile Communications
Services, for example, ambulance, police, fire and rescue. Both services are technically very
similar in that both use mobile facilities "dispatched" from centrally located base stations. See
generally J. Robinson, supra note 27, at app. B.
129. For a discussion of these needs, and the FCC Private Radio Bureau Staff's view of the
insufficiency of existing spectrum for Land Mobile purposes, see FCC, REPORT ON PUBLIC
SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS (1985); FCC, REPORT ON FUTURE PRIVATE
LAND MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS (1983) [hereinafter PRIVATE LAND
MOBILE REQUIREMENTS]. There are also strong economic pressures militating for additional
spectra: the more spectra made available, the greater the number of new communications
systems that can be sold.
130. See, e.g., Courtney, The Double Standard, 20 FED. COMM. B.J. 152 (1966) (arguing
that UHF-TV has been allocated excessive spectrum and Land Mobile has been allocated too
little). Another reason why Land Mobile looks to UHF-TV spectrum to fill its needs is that
UHF spectrum appears to be the most readily available spectrum that is compatible with ex-
isting Land Mobile services. See PRIVATE LAND MOBILE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 129, at
ch. 7, 13-14.
131. UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,587.
132. See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text. In 1982 the land mobile industry was
successful in urging Congress to enact legislation that would give public land mobile services a
"priority" in future land mobile spectrum allocation decisions. See Communications Amend-
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in UHF channels 14 through 20 for limited "sharing" with land mobile
users.'"3 In 1975, the Commission again attempted to meet the needs of the
land mobile industry by reallocating all of the upper fourteen UHF-TV
channels (70-83) for a variety of new land mobile technologies including cel-
lular telephone.' 34 But these allocation decisions have failed to satisfy land
mobile's continual demands for spectrum.' 3 5 In 1985, responding to in-
creased pressure from the land mobile industry,'36 the Commission issued
the UHF Notice recommending further sharing of certain UHF channels in
the eight largest U.S. television markets. 3 7 The UHF Notice includes the
Commission's flexible radio service proposal as a potential means of avoiding
future spectrum controversies between the television and land mobile
industries. 18
The flexible radio service proposal would provide for the unforeseen fu-
ture needs of the land mobile industry not by directly allocating new spec-
trum or by reallocating television spectrum, but instead by providing a
mechanism whereby land mobile needs could be met by a successful "mar-
ketplace" bid. 139 In effect, the land mobile operator could purchase televi-
sion stations in order to change the spectrum use from television service to
land mobile. The flexible radio proposal would establish a market in spec-
trum, allowing TV and land mobile to compete among themselves for the
right to use spectrum, rather than compete for the FCC's decisionmaking
ments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, § 120(a), 96 Stat. 1096 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(a))
(establishing a public safety priority for spectrum the Commission designates for land mobile);
see also J. Robinson, supra note 27, at app. B.
133. See Land Mobile Spectrum Allocations, 23 F.C.C.2d 325 (1970) (authorizing a geo-
graphic sharing tantamount to a reallocation of two of the lower seven UHF channels from
broadcasting to land mobile in the nation's top 20 markets). Later the FCC added three other
markets. The Commission initially allocated UHF to television channels 14-83 in its Sixth
Report and Order, 1 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 91:601, 91:697 (1952). For a useful discussion of the
development of television's allocation plan, see Johnson, Television Service and the FCC, 46
TEX. L. REV. 1100, 1113-24 (1968).
134. See Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz, 51 F.C.C.2d 945 (1975), aff'd
sub nom. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.)
(NARUC I), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
135. See, e.g., Private Land Mobile Radio Services (Channel 16 Public Safety Allocation),
59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 910 (1986) (reallocating portions of channel 16 in Los Angeles for
public safety land mobile communications).
136. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,587.
137. A total of 28 six MHz channels were proposed to be made available for use by land
mobile. In general, the UHF Notice locates spectrum for land mobile by proposing to reduce
the interference protections presently afforded the UHF stations proximate to the locations of
prospective land mobile operations. See id. at 25,587-90.
138. See id. at 25,595.
139. Id.
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favor within time-consuming allocations rulemaking proceedings.' 4° Specifi-
cally, the Commission proposal for a flexible radio service would permit
market forces to decide the use of spectrum in what is now UHF television
channels 50-59.141
A flexible system permits changes in service, from one type of communi-
cations service to another, without prior government approval 42 in response
to perceived changes in the marketplace. 143 With minimal governmental
oversight, licensees in the flexible radio service could provide whatever form
of service is most economically desirable. 144 The licensee, not the Commis-
sion, would determine the type of service provided, for example, broad-
cast, 14 5 common-carrier,146 or "general." 147 The Commission would be
relieved of the task of defining and characterizing the nature of a service
proposal in order to apply the pertinent regulatory scheme.' 48 Additionally
140. See id. at 25,595; see also supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
141. UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
142. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Section 3(o) of the 1934 Act defines "broadcasting" as "the dissemination of radio
communications intended to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay
stations." 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1982); see also 47 C.F.R. § 2.1(c) (1986). For judicial interpre-
tation of § 3(o), see Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (test
for whether a particular activity constitutes broadcasting is whether there exists an intent for
public distribution of programming that is of interest to the general audience), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 813 (1959). The Functional Music "intent" test was later affirmed in National Ass'n of
Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Telecommunications
Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding teletext trans-
mission technology to meet the statutory definition of broadcasting), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3196 (1987); KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264
F. Supp. 35, 42 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (FM subsidiary communications available only to paying
subscribers is not broadcasting).
146. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has presented
a two-pronged test to determine whether a communications service should be considered com-
mon carriage. The test is whether there is (1) a legal compulsion to serve the public, and (2) an
indiscriminate holding of oneself out "to the clientele one is suited to serve." NAR UC 1 525
F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976). For a comparison of the broad-
cast regulatory scheme versus the common-carrier regulatory scheme, and the pertinent legis-
lative history of the 1934 Act, see CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103-14
(1973).
147. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595. The Commission's UHF Notice does not
elaborate on the nature of a "general" service. It appears to be a flexible licensee engaging in a
communication service not otherwise classified as one of the traditional communications serv-
ices. Id. at 25,595 n.47. Importantly, however, the type of service chosen by the flexible licen-
see carries consequences as to the regime of rules that must be complied with. See infra note
150 and accompanying text.
148. In 1982, the Commission established a Direct Broadcast Satellite Service (DBS)
wherein applicants could choose the service classification and regulatory regime desired. See
Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 680-82 (1982), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub
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the Commission would no longer need to decide spectrum allocations ques-
tions by making comparative evaluations of fundamentally different commu-
nications services, like UHF-TV and land mobile, that presently compete
within rulemaking proceedings for use of a particular segment of spec-
trum.'4 9 Whatever the type of communications service the licensee selects,
the Commission expects compliance with the rules applicable to the chosen
service.' 5 ° The licensee would notify the Commission thirty days prior to
changing service,' 5 1 and authority to change service would be automatic un-
less the Commission notifies the licensee to the contrary.152 In this manner,
the Commission states that market forces would influence the decision of the
nom. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Thus, a DBS
licensee, and not the Commission, would choose between the different regulatory regimes of
broadcasting and common carriage. 90 F.C.C.2d at 706-11; see also PLANS AND POLICY RE-
PORT, supra note 118, at 41-42; Comment, Deregulatory Options for a Direct Broadcast Satellite
System, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 185 (1981); Comment, Direct Broadcast Satellites: Ownership
and Access to the New Technology, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 245 (1981). The DBS service differs
from the flexible radio service in that the Commission considered DBS as an emerging technol-
ogy, justifying a "wait and see" regulatory approach. Viewing DBS authorizations as experi-
mental in nature, the Commission wanted DBS participants to feel free to experiment with
innovative service offerings and organizational regimes. 90 F.C.C.2d at 707-09. The Commis-
sion implied that a permanent regulatory regime may one day be adopted. Id. at 708-09.
Applicants for DBS authorizations are expected to specify the applicable statutory regime as
part of the application process depending on the desired type of service selected. Id.
In National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the court af-
firmed most of the Commission's decision, but vacated the portion that exempted the cus-
tomer-programmers of DBS common-carrier licensees from title III broadcast regulation. Id.
at 1200-06. While the Commission has a great deal of discretion when dealing with experi-
mental new technologies, that discretion does not include "authority to experiment with its
statutory obligations." Id. at 1201; see also NAR UC 1, 525 F.2d at 644 (the regulatory status
of a particular communication must be determined from the nature of the communication, not
from the regulatory or deregulatory goals of the Commission). In Subscription Video, 2 FCC
Rcd 1001 (1986), the Commission realized that NAB may have significant implications: many
communications services that supply programming to common-carriers might now be required
to be treated as broadcasters. Id. The Commission found that subscription video technology
is not "broadcasting" within the 1934 Act where the video service does not intend to maximize
its viewing audience. The Commission identified several indicia of intent: (1) whether the
communications signal is scrambled or encrypted, (2) whether the communications service
purveyor requires payment for viewing, and (3) any other factors probative of an intent to limit
access to the signal. See id. at 1004-06. For helpful background on the problems presented by
regulation of subscription video, see Hammond, To Be or Not To Be: FCC Regulation of Video
Subscription Technologies, 35 CATH. U.L. REV. 737 (1986).
149. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
150. For example, if a flexible licensee chose to be a broadcaster, compliance with 47
C.F.R. pts. 73 and 74 governing the broadcast service would be expected. See UHF Notice,
supra note 20, at 25,595, 25,597; Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d at 680-82; see also
PLANS AND POLIcY REPORT, supra note 118, at 41-42.
151. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595, 25,597.
152. Id. at 25,595.
19871
Catholic University Law Review
licensee as to which service to provide at a particular time. 1 3
II. ANALYSIS OF THE FLEXIBLE RADIO SERVICE AND ALTERNATIVE
MARKET SYSTEMS OF ALLOCATING SPECTRUM
The introduction of market forces into decisions to allocate and use spec-
trum is not a new idea.' 54 Several earlier studies, 55 and the flexible radio
service proposal' 56 each suggest ways to remedy perceived defects in the
block allocations system.157 Most of these perceived problems arise when
spectrum is considered a scarce public resource in high demand.'
A. Prior Proposals to Use Market Forces
There is no shortage of advocates for allocation systems wherein spectrum
is allocated by market forces rather than by rulemaking proceedings that
create discrete block allocations.' 59 In A Property System for Market Alloca-
153. Id. at 25,597.
154. Whether a "market" in radio frequency spectrum should be established to remedy
perceived defects in the current block system has been well discussed in the literature. See,
e.g., De Vany, A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A
Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499 (1969); Minasian, Property Rights
in Radiation: An Alternative Approach to Radio Frequency Allocation, 18 J.L. & ECON. 221
(1975). The most often cited source for the first articulation of these ideas is Coase, supra note
33, at 17-35. Even earlier discussions are collected id. at 31 n.56. See Coase, The Economics of
Broadcasting and Government Policy, 56 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 440 (1966); Coase,
Evaluation of Public Policy Relating to Radio and Television Broadcasting: Social and Eco-
nomic Issues, 41 LAND ECON. 161 (1965); Jones, supra note 66, at'81-97; Meckling, Manage-
ment of the Frequency Spectrum, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 26, 31-34; Comment, The Public Interest
and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 802, 811-16 (1951) (explor-
ing a potential marketplace in color television technical standards); Note, supra note 33, at
472; cf Note, The FCC and AM Stereo: A Deregulatory Breach of Duty, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
265 (1984) (arguing that a Commission decision to establish a market in AM stereo technical
standards violates the 1934 Act).
155. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text; see also TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT,
supra note 74, at 15-16.
158. TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 15-16. If instead use of the spectrum
is considered bountiful, it is therefore available when desired and there should be little concern
that spectrum is being allocated improperly or inefficiently. Notions of "scarcity" are increas-
ingly being questioned. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 221-26; Spitzer, Controlling the
Content of Print and Broadcast, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1349, 1358-64 (1985) (examining various
scarcity rationales and finding that all of them fail to adequately justify regulation of broadcast
media when compared to print media); see also supra note 52 and accompanying text. Indeed,
the linchpin of the predicted benefits of market forces is the belief that free markets are the best
means to allocate scarce commodities to their "best and highest use." Fowler & Brenner,
supra note 9, at 211.
159. The most detailed system is proposed in De Vany, supra note 154. See Johnson, supra
note 68, at 518-27 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of a market in spectrum allo-
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tion of the Electromagnetic Spectrum (A Property System), 160 several legal,
economic, and technical professionals collaborated and proposed a spectrum
market experiment to test the theoretical costs and benefits of a fully speci-
fied market system of spectrum allocation including establishment of prop-
erty rights.' 6 ' This experiment would define property rights in spectrum
using the three characteristics of time,'6 2 area, 163 and spectrum." 6  These
characteristics form a "TAS package" and are specified for frequencies be-
tween 50 and 1000 MHz. 165 By contrast, the flexible radio proposal deals
with a pure market in only one of these dimensions, time.'6 6 This proposal
does not provide for changing service areas outside of the area characteris-
tics initially made available. 167  With respect to spectrum characteristics,
flexible licensees could reduce operating bandwidths within the initially allo-
cated spectrum but would be prohibited from exceeding the originally allo-
cated bandwidth of six MHz.' 6' Thus, the "spectrum market" would be
limited to a six MHz maximum size. 16
9
A Property System also proposed a statutory framework for sale of TAS
packages to the public.' 7 ° Owners of these packages would be free to buy
and sell TAS areas, raise and lower signal strengths, transfer TAS rights on a
time basis, or transfer any or all of their spectrum.' 7 ' There would be no
cation and generally endorsing the seminal Coase economic approach); Minasian, supra note
154, at 227-35 (presenting a pure market approach using property rights in spectrum); Note,
supra note 33, at 476-79 (proposing a limited marketplace pricing mechanism, designed to
attain efficient frequency allocation but continuing government oversight in areas such as im-
plementing new technology, and "prevent[ing] too great a concentration of control [over]
broadcasting facilities").
160. De Vany, supra note 154.
161. Id. at 1499, 1499-501, 1512-29. A detailed statute is proposed that would enable Con-
gress to "sanction" this experiment, thus acknowledging the desirability of congressional clari-
fication of the 1934 Act. Id. at 1529-34.
162. The time component is defined as the duration of the radio transmission. Id. at 1512-
13.
163. The area component is defined as rectangular or polygonal boundaries within which
field strengths of a specified amount would be permitted. Id. at 1513-15. Transaction costs
would be saved by using existing conveyancing procedures and avoiding undefined "no-man's"
lands. Id.
164. The spectrum component is defined as the "bandwidth" of emissions, i.e., the fre-
quency range over which the time and area rights attach. Id. at 1515-17.
165. Id. at 1501-02.
166. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
167. Id.
168. Six MHz is the bandwidth of one television channel. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.601 (1986);
see also infra note 289 and accompanying text.
169. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
170. De Vany, supra note 154, at 1529-34.
171. Id. at 1529-30.
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restrictions on transmitter power, antenna location, or height.1 72 In a flexi-
ble radio service, licensees would have the freedom to allocate bandwidth,
time, and raise or lower signal strengths as long as these changes remained
within the Commission's original allocation.
1 73
In order to record TAS agreements covering changes in any TAS compo-
nent or any other transaction a potential purchaser would wish to know, A
Property System proposed establishing a federal "central registry."' 74 Under
the flexible radio service proposal, however, the FCC would continue to be
the repository of this information.175 Nevertheless, the Commission left un-
specified the extent to which flexible licensees, who decide to "sublet" their
spectrum, must inform the Commission of the kind of service provided and
the entities providing the service. 176 The various requirements for govern-
ment licensing of stations in the public interest under the Communications
Act of 1934177 would seem to be circumvented if the flexible licensee, and
not the Commission, is deciding who and what operates on the frequencies
of the licensee's flexible allocation.' 7 1 In effect, the Commission is delegat-
ing to private parties the spectrum use decisions Congress delegated to the
FCC.
To establish a market system, A Property System advocates the use of auc-
tions, or, alternatively, long term leases of spectrum. 179 State law would
resolve the inevitable disputes over TAS rights.' In contrast, under its
existing flexible radio service proposal, it is not clear how the Commission
would convert existing television licensees into flexible licensees,' 8 ' nor is it
clear how the Commission would enforce applicable rules' 82 if it were re-
moved from its current role of spectrum "supervisor."'
18 3
172. Id. at 1530.
173. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,587, 25,595-96; see also infra notes 202-07 and
accompanying text.
174. De Vany, supra note 154, at 1530.
175. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 220-30 and accompanying text; see also supra note 148 and accompa-
nying text; cf. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (requir-
ing the customer-programmers of DBS licensees to comply with title III broadcast regulation
if broadcasting is the service being engaged in).
179. De Vany, supra note 154, at 1531-32.
180. Id. at 1533-34.
181. One problem with "grandfathering," for example, is that it theoretically produces a
change in value of existing stations equal to the difference between the value of the right to
operate as a flexible licensee and the right to operate as a television station. See Fowler &
Brenner, supra note 9, at 243.
182. UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595-97; infra note 287 and accompanying text.
183. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595-97. The flexible licensee must still comply
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A market system of spectrum allocation, such as the proposal in A Prop-
erty System, is termed a "pure" market allocation system, and has several
advantages. 184 These include providing incentives to use spectra economi-
cally and efficiently, 185 providing means for comparing the value of different
uses of spectrum, 18 6 engendering less federal oversight, 187 eliminating time-
consuming allocation proceedings, 188 creating a source of federal revenue, 181
and furthering the first amendment freedoms of broadcasters.' 90
The purported disadvantages are several. First, the business expectations
of existing communications services that become or may become market par-
ticipants might be disrupted, absent some method of preserving the legal
status quo for existing licensees. 91 Second, a market system would result in
technically inefficient use of spectrum by permitting technically incompatible
services to use the same block allocation of spectrum' 9 2 or by creating new
with the rules for the particular communications service being offered. But Commission re-
view would be minimal or even non-existent. As a practical matter, enforcing Commission
rules may be inconsistent with the desire to grant increased flexibility. See id.
184. See generally PLANS AND POLICY REPORT, supra note 118, at 4-12.
185. See Coase, supra note 33, at 30; Johnson, supra note 68, at 520; Jones, supra note 66,
at 83; Note, supra note 33, at 473. There are at least three meanings carried by the term
"spectrum efficiency." It can mean allowing for differences in local spectrum demand to be-
come a factor in determining the use of spectrum. UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595. But
spectrum efficiency can also mean insuring that available spectrum is used by the entity that
places the highest value on the spectrum's use. See PLANS AND POLICY REPORT, supra note
118, at 3; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 211. Finally, spectrum efficiency can mean the
use of new technology to multiply the capability of spectrum to support new users. Fowler &
Brenner, supra note 9, at 212 n.23; Robinson, supra note 39, at 1253-55.
186. Note, supra note 33, at 473.
187. Id.
188. Johnson, supra note 68, at 520.
189. Revenue would be raised by auctioning the frequencies according to the pure market
system. See Coase, supra note 33, at 24; Johnson, supra note 68, at 520; Note, supra note 33, at
474. Recently, the Commission has sought enabling legislation to authorize auctions of non-
mass media spectrum. This proposal, however, has encountered significant political opposi-
tion. See S. REP. No. 301, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1986); Spectrum Auction Kicking Around
on Capitol Hill, BROADCASTING, May 18, 1987, at 77-78; see also E. Kwerel & A. Felker,
Using Auctions to Select FCC Licensees (Federal Communications Commission Office of
Plans and Policy Working Paper No. 16, 1985). Compare Botein, Comparative Broadcast Li-
censing Procedures and the Rule of Law: A Fuller Investigation, 6 GA. L. REV. 743, 759-61
(1972) (auctions would "abandon any attempt at reaching a reasoned decision") with Geller,
The Appropriate Use of Lottery in Federal Licensing, 35 ADMIN. L. REV. 67 (1983) (generally
endorsing the use of spectrum auctions to simplify administration of license applications).
190. Coase, supra note 33, at 37-40; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 217-18; Johnson,
supra note 68, at 520.
191. Absent grandfathering, a TV station would merely be one of several competing appli-
cants for a flexible license. See Robinson, supra note 39, at 1251.
192. See Jones, supra note 66, at 87-88; Robinson, supra note 39, at 1253-55. Land mobile
communications services are fundamentally different from TV broadcast stations and, there-
fore, raise technical concerns that must be accommodated if both services are to remain inter-
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forms of interference.' 93 A market system has also been criticized because it
would fail to account for noneconomic factors or "public policy" con-
cerns. 194 Moreover, equipment manufacturing efficiencies would be lost if
different communications services were found in the same spectrum on a
locally varying basis.' 95 For example, there could be a disincentive to manu-
facture TV receivers for national markets when a manufacturer is no longer
certain that TV stations will be found on the receiver's channels., 96 There
might also be an incentive to compromise technical standards to the detri-
ment of the public's viewing.197 Other objections voiced by critics are fears
of increased monopolization, 198 concentration of spectrum use in "wealthy
corporations,"'199 stockpiling,20 0 and outright political opposition.
20 1
B. Spectrum Markets and Flexible Use
The flexible radio service can be described as a "quasi-market" allocation
system in radio spectrum: it shares some of the attributes of a pure market
system and some of the attributes of a block allocation system. It is not a
pure market approach, since the FCC would continue to license users. Also,
unlike a pure market approach, there is no provision in the proposal for
ference-free. Id. But see PLANS AND POLICY REPORT, supra note 118, at 30-31 (suggesting
several ways to prevent interference between mobile and fixed stations).
193. For example, so-called "intermodulation" interference is very difficult to foresee. This
form of interference occurs when two or more undesired signals combine within a receiver in
such a way as to produce a third signal inside of the receiver that appears as interference. See
Jones, supra note 66, at 86-87; Robinson, supra note 39, at 1254; see also De Vany, supra note
154, at 1520-22 (suggesting three ways to assign liability for intermodulation interference:
(1) the last party transmitting is liable for intermodulation interference caused to others;
(2) existing users have absolute protection against intermodulation interference, and, therefore,
must carry the newcomers' economic burden; and (3) existing users are denied any protection,
and would have to pay costs to protect themselves from the newcomer's interference).
194. See PLANS AND POLICY REPORT, supra note 118, at 5; Johnson, supra note 68, at 522-
23 ("For the market activities to represent consumer desires, all those affected by a spectrum
use would have to be able to 'bid' in the market."); Note, supra note 33, at 475; see also Jones,
supra note 66, at 90-91 (in bidding for spectrum to support public safety communications,
government bids might not reflect the true value to public of increased police communications
capacity).
195. See Jones, supra note 66, at 87-88. The so-called "block" system also permits the
establishment of "reserve" spectrum to provide for future growth. See PLANS AND POLICY
REPORT, supra note 118, at 5.
196. See Robinson, supra note 39, at 1255. The Commission staff notes that block alloca-
tion systems "may provide some increase in design certainty to equipment manufacturers."
PLANS AND POLICY REPORT, supra note. 118, at 5.
197. See Robinson, supra note 39, at 1255.
198. See Jones, supra note 66, at 91-92.
199. See Note, supra note 33, at 474.
200. See Jones, supra note 66, at 93.
201. Id. at 97; see also Johnson, supra note 68, at 525; Meckling, supra note 154, at 26.
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licensees to acquire spectrum greater than six MHz.2"2 Nor does a flexible
radio service include any provision to extend "flexible" coverage areas be-
yond the initially established interference-free contours.20 3 Yet a pure spec-
trum market would exist within the six MHz allocation in the designated
geographic area.2" A flexible licensee providing television service would
have the option of "developing" the spectrum for smaller bandwidth com-
munications services, like land mobile communications.2 °5 Theoretically,
one six MHz channel could support hundreds of land mobile users.2"6 The
"market" would influence the decision as to which service to provide.20 7
Another important difference between pure market proposals and the
Commission's proposed flexible radio service is that the authors of A Prop-
erty System believe that a change in the 1934 Act is necessary.20 ' The Com-
mission, however, believes that no change in the Act is needed to implement
its flexible radio service proposal.20 9 While the Commission's flexible propo-
sal is narrower than a pure market approach, it nonetheless raises legal is-
sues as to whether the trusteeship model of the 1934 Act would be
transgressed.210
III. A CHANGE IN THE 1934 ACT Is NECESSARY
TO AVOID LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
For the Commission to establish a flexible radio service, it must make a
determination that the institution of a flexible service is in the public inter-
est.21 The Commission should also find, at least implicitly, that a flexible
service is not otherwise precluded by the 1934 Act.212 The difficult problem
faced by the Commission is whether the statutory public interest standard is
202. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,597.
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
205. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595-97.
206. See infra note 289 and accompanying text; see also Courtney, supra note 130, at 156-
59 (arguing that each occupied TV channel actually precludes many more TV channels worth
of land mobile communications due to the complex set of technical standards protecting TV
reception from interference).
207. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
208. See De Vany, supra note 154, at 1529-34.
209. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,597-98.
210. See infra notes 211-61 and accompanying text.
211. See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982); see also infra notes 224-30 and accompanying text. The
Commission's UHF Notice states that "allowing licensees more flexibility in choosing services
will serve the public interest." UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
212. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,597-98; see also Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev.
Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (FCC's public interest finding on ownership issue
cannot override explicit statutory prohibition).
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broad enough to permit the establishment of a flexible radio service.2"' In
the Commission's view, the few legal questions raised by a broad public in-
terest finding either do not raise substantive issues or are easily resolved.214
These issues do, however, raise serious concerns and should not be summa-
rily decided without critical analysis. Among the specific issues presented by
the Commission's proposal are: (1) whether the proposed flexible radio ser-
vice transgresses existing statutory provisions that prohibit ownership of
spectrum and provide for licensing of spectrum users;215 (2) whether the
Commission may exclude social or other public interest factors in making its
public interest determinations; 216 (3) whether a flexible radio service would
produce a market "bias" toward smaller bandwidth communications serv-
ices;217 and (4) whether administrative difficulties that arise evidence an im-
practical view of today's market in communications services.21 8
If the Commission adopts rules implementing the flexible radio service,
flexible licensees would experience significant legal and practical uncertainty
that invites confusion and probable litigation.21 9 This would be an unfortu-
nate fate for an otherwise worthwhile solution to the Commission's general
block allocation problems and the specific dispute between UHF broadcast-
ers and land mobile communications services over the allocation of UHF
spectrum. Many of the ideas and rationales supporting a flexible radio ser-
vice clearly have merit and should be applied where Congress unequivocally
approves. If successful legal challenges to the flexible radio service are to be
avoided, the Commission should seek and obtain explicit statutory authority
to institute a flexible radio service.
A. Possible Explicit Preclusion by Statutory Construction
There are several possible grounds on which a flexible radio service ap-
pears to be prohibited by the 1934 Act.220 The Commission could exceed
the bounds of the public interest standard by interpreting the 1934 Act too
broadly.22" ' It could also grant or create rights held by flexible licensees that
are interpreted as prohibited property interests 222 or deny statutory hearing
213. See infra notes 271-82 and accompanying text.
214. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,597-98.
215. See infra notes 234-47 and accompanying text.
216. See infra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
217. See infra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
218. See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 220-91 and accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 224-91 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 224-30 and accompanying text.
222. See infra notes 234-47 and accompanying text.
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rights held by competing applicants for a frequency used for broadcasting.223
1. Broad Interpretation of the 1934 Act
The Commission has a responsibility to make basic spectrum allocation
decisions itself,224 in accordance with the public interest, 225 after affording
parties an opportunity for notice and comment.226 Section 303(b) of the
1934 Act states that the Commission shall, as the public convenience, inter-
est and necessity requires, "[p]rescribe the nature of the service to be ren-
dered by each class of licensed stations and each station within any class." 2
27
There are at least two logical interpretations of the Commission's proposed
flexible radio service in light of section 303(b). Construed broadly, the stat-
ute permits the classification of a licensed flexible communications service
with a regulating regime selected by the flexible licensee. 228 Construed nar-
rowly, the statute requires the Commission, not the licensee, to determine
the specific nature of the communications service and regulatory regime pro-
vided in designated spectrum. 229 The difference between the two readings is
the extent to which the Commission can define a communications service
with flexible attributes, or whether it must, with more specificity, determine
the nature of the service of individual station classes. In the context of a
flexible radio service, a broad reading of the statute is troublesome. The
Commission would seem to be delegating to a private party not only the
authority to decide to reallocate spectrum for changeable purposes, but also
the kind of spectrum uses and technical decisions Congress delegated to the
Commission.230
2. Ownership and the Flexible Radio Service
A licensee in a flexible radio service would come closer to owning its spec-
trum than any existing Commission licensee.2 31 Such a licensee would pos-
sess unprecedented control over the use of spectrum initially allocated by the
223. See infra notes 248-61 and accompanying text.
224. 47 U.S.C. § 303.
225. Id.
226. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
227. 47 U.S.C. § 303(b).
228. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595. A broad reading would also permit a
flexible licensee to select power outputs, and whatever technical standards the licensee deems
appropriate to avoid interference to other spectrum users. In effect, the Commission would
then be "licensing" any use of spectrum by any interested party, so long as an existing user is
not adversely affected. Cf supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text.
229. Cf supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text.
230. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595; see also supra notes 144-53 and accompa-
nying text.
231. See infra notes 234-47 and accompanying text.
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Commission,2 32 with almost complete security that its license would never
be reclaimed by the government.233
a. Nature of Statutory Ownership
A flexible radio service licensee resembles a licensee in a service that
would "own" its channels of radio communications.234 But the 1934 Act
expressly forbids the Commission from establishing property rights in spec-
trum.2 5 The 1934 Act requires the Commission to license radio spectrum
users for limited periods of time.236 Section 301 provides that the purpose of
the Act is "to provide for the use of such channels [of radio transmission]
but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time,. . . and
no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms,
conditions, and periods of the license.",237 But in a flexible radio service, the
extent of freedom to use the assigned frequencies would be unprecedented.
Since there is no guidance in the 1934 Act or its legislative history as to what
characteristics of spectrum use are to constitute "ownership" of spectrum,
the Commission is left with considerable leeway in determining the charac-
teristics of radio spectrum use without calling such use "ownership." Conse-
quently, the Commission policymakers and the courts appear to have a great
deal of discretion in establishing policies and regulations that promote char-
acteristics of spectrum use that approach ownership.238
232. See infra notes 239-47 and accompanying text.
233. See infra notes 248-61 and accompanying text.
234. Although the FCC continues to require a license, there would be minimal regulatory
oversight and virtually no chance of having a license revoked. See infra notes 239-47 and
accompanying text.
235. In fact, no private rights were intended to be created at all. See Daly v. CBS, 309 F.2d
83, 85 (7th Cir. 1962); Post v. Payton, 323 F. Supp. 799, 801-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). And, licen-
sees are required to sign "a waiver of any claim to the use of any particular frequency or of the
electromagnetic spectrum as against the regulatory power of the United States ...... 47
U.S.C. § 304.
236. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c); see also supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
237. 47 U.S.C. § 301.
238. There are several characteristics of ownership that are logical to examine in an effort
to determine the extent to which use of a radio frequency approaches "ownership thereof." A
court, as well as the Commission, could look at the following factors to determine if a flexible
radio service transgresses the statutory ownership prohibition. These characteristics are
(1) the extent that the occupant of the spectrum has control or authority over the use of that
spectrum, without government oversight; (2) an ability to "sublease" spectrum for supplemen-
tal, alternative, or different uses without prior government approval; (3) the extent that the
occupant may use the spectrum in perpetuity; and (4) the degree of protection from a third
party's desire to wrest control over the spectrum from a current occupant. Some argue that
"deregulation" in effect moves the broadcast industry much closer to "owning" its frequencies.
The recent Chairman of the FCC, Mark Fowler, supports replacing the current renewal pro-
cess with a fee to be paid by spectrum users. See, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 247-
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Recently, the Commission has moved toward giving broadcast licensees
increased autonomy over the use of their frequencies.23 9 Specifically, the
Commission has authorized FM licensees to use their subchannels for any
lawful and nonbroadcast purpose, 2 ° granted similar authority to AM licen-
sees, 24 1 authorized television licensees to use their vertical blanking interval
for nonbroadcast purposes, 24 2 and allowed broadcast licensees to lease the
"excess capacity" of auxiliary broadcasting facilities. 243 The recent proposal
for a flexible radio service is consistent with these decisions, but goes much
further. In the past, broadcast licensees had been given increased flexibility
only over communications channels that are ancillary or auxiliary to the
main purpose of the spectrum allocation. 244 A flexible radio service, how-
ever, would give flexibility to the essential and primary purpose for which
the allocation was initially established. 245 For the first time, a licensee pro-
viding broadcast service could decide, sua sponte, to cease broadcasting and
reconfigure the spectrum allocation to provide land mobile service. 24 6 No
prior government approval would be necessary.24 7
55. In recent years, the Commission has expanded the uses to be made of broadcast frequen-
cies. See infra notes 240-45 and accompanying text. Some have argued that the Fowler Com-
mission's "marketplace" approach to regulation is inconsistent with the FCC's mandate to
license stations in the public interest. See generally Campbell, supra note 114 (questioning
whether the Commission's initiatives to deregulate the radio industry are consistent with the
public interest).
239. See infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
240. See In re Use of Subsidiary Communications Authorizations, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1519 (1983) (providing authority for FM broadcast stations to use their subcarriers for non-
broadcast purposes). FM subcarriers are radio channels that are transmitted along with the
main, or "public" channel, but which cannot be received without a specially equipped FM
receiver. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.293, 73.295 (1986).
241. See In re Use of the AM Carrier Signals, 100 F.C.C.2d 5 (1984) (authorizing AM
broadcast stations to transmit subsidiary signals that do not interfere with main channel pro-
gramming); see also In re Use of the Carrier for AM Utility Load Management Purposes, 51
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 798 (1982) (AM stations permitted to control electricity demand
through the use of nondisruptive signals).
242. A television station's "vertical blanking interval" is a window of time during television
signal transmission within which data communication services can be carefully inserted with-
out visibly impairing television reception quality. See Vertical Blanking Interval, 101
F.C.C.2d 973 (1985) (expands authority of TV licensees to use vertical blanking interval for
nonbroadcast services); see also In re Transmission of Teletext by TV Stations, 53 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1309 (1983) (broadcasters allowed to transmit teletext on the vertical blanking
interval for nonbroadcast purposes), reconsideration granted in part, 101 F.C.C.2d 827 (1985).
243. See Broadcast Auxiliary Facility Sharing, 93 F.C.C.2d 570, 573 (1983) (authorizing
all broadcast licensees to "share" their auxiliary facilities with any "other entity [broadcast or
nonbroadcast] for transmission of any material, broadcast or nonbroadcast").
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The issue presented by the flexible radio service is whether the autonomy
granted to flexible licensees is sufficient to be considered "ownership" within
the meaning of the 1934 Act. It is axiomatic that the statute limits the Com-
mission's discretion to confer ownership rights because of the necessary gov-
ernment license. Thus, if the license itself is deemed to convey ownership
rights, the statute is transgressed.
b. Periodic Renewals and the Flexible Radio Service
If a flexible licensee could expect to hold its license in perpetuity, then de
facto ownership of spectrum would exist. In a flexible radio service such de
facto ownership will occur unless the Commission has some reasonable
means to evaluate whether licenses should be renewed. Without meaningful
license renewal criteria, the Commission cannot renew flexible licenses on a
rational basis, and proceedings to revoke a flexible license necessarily would
be arbitrary in nature.
The 1934 Act requires the Commission to license stations for limited peri-
ods of time.241 Interested parties may petition the Commission to deny an
incumbent licensee's renewal application as well as an original application
for a new broadcast station.249 When a challenge is brought to the license
renewal of an incumbent broadcaster, the Commission compares the prom-
ised performance of the challenger with the past performance of the incum-
bent and, according to a complex set of comparative factors, makes a public
interest finding to either grant or deny the renewal application.25° Though
there is no guarantee that licenses will be renewed, as a practical matter,
denials of renewal applications after comparative proceedings rarely oc-
cur.251 Over an extended period of time, a licensee learns that it may con-
tinue to operate on its assigned frequency in perpetuity, thereby gaining a de
248. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c); see also supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
249. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(d); see also supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
250. A license is renewed only after a Commission determination that such a renewal
would serve the public interest. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(d). A glimpse of the murky world of
comparative license renewal standards can be found in Cowles Florida Broadcasting, Inc., 60
F.C.C.2d 372 (1976), clarified, 62 F.C.C.2d 953 (1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Cen-
tral Florida Enterprises v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), on remand sub nom. Cowles
Broadcasting, Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d 993 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Central Florida Enterprises v.
FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983) and in Kuklin, Contin-
uing Confusion: The Renewal of Broadcast Licenses, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 95 (1983).
251. See Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC, 683 F.2d at 510 ("We suspect that some-
where, sometime, somehow, some television licensee should fail in a comparative renewal chal-
lenge, but the FCC has never discovered such a licensee yet." (emphasis in original)). The
problem presented by comparative license renewals is how to compare the incumbent's past
performance as a licensee with the promises and expectations of the challenger on renewal.
See Anthony, Toward Simplicity and Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing Proceed-
ings, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1971); Kuklin, supra note 250; Comment, Comparative License
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facto property interest in spectrum.2 52 The drafters of the 1934 Act surely
did not intend for the Commission to confer de facto property interests to
spectrum users.253
In a flexible radio service, the licensee's assurance of continual renewal of
its license would be much greater than the assurance held by today's broad-
cast licensees. There is much less of a substantive basis on which to make
comparative evaluations of flexible licensees. But in today's broadcast ser-
vice the challenger, at a minimum, is required to offer the same type of fun-
damental communications service as the incumbent.2 54 In a flexible radio
service, however, the challenger could propose a different communications
service, thus adding an additional dimension to the Commission's public in-
terest determination.255 The Commission states that it would ignore the
type of service offered in making comparative evaluations of assignments on
available channels for renewals and in issuing new licenses. 256 The Commis-
sion would base its decisions on mutually exclusive applications on "overall
performance." Yet, the Commission does not specify how it would make the
requisite public interest determination upon license renewal, or how the per-
formance of different communications services would be compared.25 7
Whatever the criteria used to judge "overall performance" turn out to be,
broadcast licenses for channels 50-59, but not other broadcast licenses on
different channels, could become subject to a different standard of re-
newal.258 Alternatively, a flexible licensee providing common-carrier service
could become vulnerable to the types of renewal challenges that traditionally
face broadcasters. And, in a true market for spectrum, it should be econom-
Renewal Hearings and Protection of the "Public Interest": Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC,
92 HARV. L. REV. 1801 (1979).
252. Former Commissioner Robinson stated, "a property right does in fact exist as a conse-
quence of the historic practice of renewing licenses except for misbehavior. To pretend other-
wise is to blink at reality." Cowles Florida Broadcasting v. FCC, 60 F.C.C.2d at 446; see also
Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 247 ("Indeed, the reasonable expectation of license renewal
enjoyed by broadcasters today comes close to a property right, in reality if not in name.").
253. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
254. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(a)-(d) (generally applies to the issuance and renewal of licenses
for broadcasting).
255. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
256. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595; cf PLANS AND POLICY REPORT, supra
note 118, at 43-44 (arguing that the Commission may designate whatever comparative issues it
finds applicable).
257. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595; see also infra notes 258-61 and accompany-
ing text. The problem of license renewal generally is avoided by using a "pure" market ap-
proach, i.e., by creating a system wherein property rights to spectrum are defined such that it is
no longer necessary for the FCC to allocate or police the use of spectrum, or to renew licenses.
See De Vany, supra note 154, at 1533-34.
258. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
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ically viable, at some point, to invoke the renewal process to litigate for a
license rather than purchase a license.
In the renewal circumstances of a flexible radio service licensee, the re-
newal expectancy must be greater than the renewal expectancy of current
television broadcasters.259 The Commission would be faced with determin-
ing renewal challenges from applicants proposing or using different types of
communications services.2" Thus, a flexible licensee would have a much
greater degree of certainty to operate the license in perpetuity. While still
subject to periodic license renewal challenges, the renewal process would be
rendered nearly meaningless for flexible licensee renewal participants.2 6
Whether such certainty of license renewal rises to the level of "ownership"
of spectrum is an issue only a court of competent jurisdiction can decide.
3. Right to a Hearing Requirement and The Flexible Radio Service
Another statutory obstacle encountered by authorization of a flexible ra-
dio service is the requirement for full hearings contained in section 309(e) of
the 1934 Act. In Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC,2 62 the Supreme Court in-
terpreted section 309(e) of the Act to require the Commission to hold a com-
parative hearing where two or more mutually exclusive uses of radio
frequency spectrum are presented. Even though Ashbacker involved mutu-
ally exclusive original applications for licenses, its principle governs renewal
applications where rival applicants challenge licensed incumbents.263 In all
cases, however, the notion of mutually exclusive applicants applies to
259. From an administrative viewpoint, the block allocations system makes the Commis-
sion's job easier when it comes to evaluating renewal challenges to incumbent licenses. When
the Commission creates the initial block allocations by rulemaking, it decides which of several
competing communications services is to have priority. See supra notes 61-73 and accompany-
ing text. Under a flexible radio service, the Commission may have to make these decisions
each time a flexible license comes up for renewal. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
260. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
261. See supra notes 248-59 and accompanying text.
262. 326 U.S. 327 (1945). In Ashbacker, the Commission, having two mutually exclusive
applications before it, granted one and designated the other for hearing, leaving one applica-
tion in control of the radio frequency and the other with the greater burden of challenging a
now incumbent licensee. Id. at 328.
263. See New South Media Corp. v. FCC, 685 F.2d 708, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Citizens
Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1210-12 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Citizens, the
court overturned the 1970 FCC policy statement limiting the comparative renewal hearing to a
single issue-whether the incumbent licensee had rendered substantial service in the past. Id.
at 1211-12. In the Commission's view, if such service were found by the hearing examiner, the
comparative hearing ends and the incumbent license would be renewed without an opportunity
for the challenger to compare his promised service against the incumbent's broadcast record.
Id. The Commission has much discretion in evaluating the particular factual circumstances
that warrant a § 309(e) hearing. See United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 90-91 & n.87 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (en banc) ("The substantiality and materiality of purported issues of fact .... are
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licenses to compete in the same communications service.264 As the Commis-
sion noted, Ashbacker has never been applied in either an allocation or a
rulemaking proceeding. 265 But competition before the Commission, among
qualified applicants and for favorable comparative consideration, is consid-
ered to be the process most likely to serve the public.26 6 Thus, the legal issue
is whether the FCC is required to accept competing applications and con-
duct comparative hearings if (1) an existing television broadcaster becomes a
flexible licensee and continues to provide television service; or (2) a flexible
licensee decides to change service from a broadcaster to, for example, land
mobile service.267 In either case, Ashbacker rights may apply.268
The extent that Ashbacker would apply to a transition from a TV licensee
to a flexible licensee providing TV service is unknown. So, too, is the extent
to which Ashbacker rights may attach when a flexible licensee changes ser-
vice from a television broadcaster to a land mobile service provider. But the
statutory right to a hearing cannot be limited to a single issue, and must
depend on all relevant criteria.269  Thus, the Commission may avoid
Ashbacker issues by the innovative finding that viewers will benefit if statu-
issues to be evaluated . . . by the Commission. [The] court's oversight role is quite limited
....11).
264. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
265. See WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 617-18 (2d Cir.) (no separate eviden-
tiary hearing required where every licensee is granted presunrise authority by rulemaking),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968); UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,597; see also United States
v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 202-05 (1956) (notwithstanding statutory hearing
requirement, the Commission retains power to promulgate rules of general application, such
that the Commission effectively determines the public interest for each applicant); American
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 629 (D.C. Cir.) (rulemaking power should not be "shack-
led... by importation of formalities developed for the adjudicatory process"), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 843 (1966).
266. Community Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 753, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
267. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
268. Id. In the UHF Notice, the Commission overlooked the central issue addressed in
Ashbacker: that the § 309(e) right to a hearing requirement prohibits the Commission from
granting "one [license] that effectively precludes the other." 326 U.S. 327, 330 (1945). Com-
pare id. with UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595-97. Otherwise, the promise of a hearing is
"an empty thing." Ashbacker, 326 U.S. at 330. Indeed, the concept of mutual exclusivity is
central to the Ashbacker doctrine. See, e.g., Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC,
513 F.2d 1142, 1165-66 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
269. See Community Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 363 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also
South Fla. Television Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Johnston Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Comparative criteria consistently have
been applied to renewal proceedings. A § 309 hearing can also be required to determine
whether a new competitor would damage service "to an extent inconsistent with the public
interest." See Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The
Carroll doctrine, however, has never been invoked to deny the grant of an application for a
new broadcast station. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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tory hearing rights are denied to potential flexible licensees. The Commis-
sion should keep in mind, however, that comparative considerations apply to
the type of communications service provided as well as the substantive quali-
fications of the applicants.2 71
B. Flexibility and the Public Interest Standard
The statutory public interest standard confers on the Commission broad
discretion to allocate frequencies. 27 The issue presented by the flexible pro-
posal is whether the flexible radio service is consistent with the 1934 Act's
public interest standard, even where the proposal encompasses a fundamen-
tal change in the historical block allocation process by which the Commis-
sion administers the current statutory scheme.272 Thus, a Commission
finding that establishment of a flexible radio service is in the public interest
carries significant consequences. 273 Among other issues, the Commission
should determine whether, in a flexible radio service, price alone is a satisfac-
tory manner to determine the best public interest use of spectrum; and
whether competing, noneconomic factors are less important to the public
interest.274
Implicit in the Commission's proposal to use market forces is the premise
that a market allocation system, where the use of available spectrum is deter-
mined by the entity that pays the highest price, is itself in the public inter-
est. 275 The assumption is that economics alone can determine the public
interest.276 But a purely economic approach ignores the social or otherwise
public aspects of spectrum allocations;2 77 it is difficult to place a value on
270. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943).
271. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
274. See infra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
275. Employing a price mechanism to determine spectrum use should be distinguished
from employing a price mechanism to determine who will use spectrum for a previously FCC-
determined purpose. Arguably, today's lively market in television station trading is a market
allocation system: use of a television channel goes to the entity willing to pay the highest price.
Cf Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 231-33 (stating "a key resource in broadcasting, exclu-
sivity of radio spectrum, is allocated by governmental decision, not by price").
276. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 210; cf
Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974) (where Federal Power Commis-
sion (FPC) is required by statute to ensure rates for natural gas are "just and reasonable," FPC
may not rely exclusively on market prices to determine rates).
277. See De Vany, supra note 154, at 1256-57; Johnson, supra note 68, at 523 ("The gov-
ernment must interfere with the pricing mechanism in situations where the market can no
longer be counted on for efficiency or equity."); Jones, supra note 66, at 90; see also Robinson,
supra note 39, at 1256.
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social or other noneconomic components of the public interest.278 The prob-
lem faced is the impossibility of comparing, on an economic basis, two or
more fundamentally different uses of spectrum. Under the flexible radio ser-
vice envisioned by the Commission, a police department would be eligible to
purchase from the incumbent television broadcaster the right to use televi-
sion channel 50 in a particular locality.279 Unlike commercial broadcasting,
a police department does not produce a dollar profit that can be analyzed in
order to establish the value of one television channel's worth of police com-
munications. Instead, the business of police communications is public ser-
vice, and the intangible profit is difficult to measure. The valuation
yardsticks used by the police department are fundamentally different than
the valuation yardsticks used by the television broadcaster.28°
Even where a commercial, profit-making communications enterprise
wishes to acquire a flexible license to use spectrum, several traditional public
interest factors are ignored where economics alone determines spectrum use.
Certainly, two or more private commercial enterprises can be rationally
compared and valued. But different problems emerge. When a particular
spectrum use may be so profitable that it attracts a large amount of spectrum
use, less profitable but publicly useful services could be minimized or even
phased out completely. 28' In other words, the market's supply and price of
a particular communications service may not comport with the public's ex-
pectations.282 The current allocation scheme shelters less profitable services
from being influenced by the success of higher profit services. A market
system, therefore, may prejudice less profitable services even where some
public utility or demand is present.
278. See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 14, at 473-74; see also supra note 194 and accompany-
ing text.
279. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595.
280. See Robinson, supra note 39, at 1257.
281. Market enthusiasts will argue that such an outcome is itself in the public interest; that,
as a less-profitable use becomes less common, demand for that service will rise thus increasing
its profitability making it more attractive to use; and, that as the supply of the profitable enter-
prise becomes large, it will become increasingly less attractive for new entrants. The net "mar-
ket" effect is to come to a supply/demand balance. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at
210-12. However, the supply/demand economic balancing only makes sense where a supply/
demand balance is in fact realistic. As long as spectrum is considered to be technically scarce,
it is possible that some spectrum uses are so profitable as to use up all available spectrum even
where alternative spectrum uses are equally attractive. See infra notes 288-91 and accompany-
ing text.
282. For example, it is possible that one type of service could become predominant over
other types, possibly leading to a monopoly of one communications service in a particular area.
See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595-97; PLANS AND POLICY REPORT, supra note 118, at
1-4.
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C. Practical and Administrative Difficulties
Another issue raised by the UHF Notice is that the Commission may ex-
perience difficulty in the administration and enforcement of a flexible radio
service where the Commission would no longer be responsible for classifying
the nature of a particular type of communications service, other than simply
deeming the licensee to be "flexible." '283 Licensees would choose regulatory
regimes and simply notify the Commission of their self-declared status.284
The Commission states that the flexible licensees' decisions would be subject
to Commission review 285 but leaves unspecified the precise means for doing
so. 286 Thus, it is unclear how the Commission would enforce the regulatory
regime chosen by the licensee or how the status of licensees would be deter-
mined in borderline cases.287
Moreover, to the extent a market in spectrum could be established, it
would be a tilted market for several reasons. Because of television broad-
casters' heavy existing investment in plant and equipment, there is an inher-
ent market bias toward keeping services the way they are. The investment
by a television broadcaster in equipment-easily tens of millions of dollars-
is worthless to a flexible licensee endeavoring to provide land mobile com-
munications. At the outset, therefore, the value of the flexible license is
greater to a prospective licensee desiring to duplicate the incumbent's service
than it is to a prospective licensee faced with the task of building a new
communications system essentially from scratch.288 Second, there is a kind
283. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,597 (flexible licensees would be required to
"describe and classify the service to be provided under the flexibility option").
284. See id. at 25,595. However, customer-programmers of flexible licensees who elected
common-carrier status are presumably subject to title III broadcast regulation. See National
Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1199-205 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also supra note
148 and accompanying text.
285. UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595; cf Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d
676, 706-11 (1982).
286. See UHF Notice, supra note 20, at 25,595-97.
287. The enforcement dilemma faced by the Commission is how to review licensee compli-
ance with applicable rules when the licensee (1) characterizes for itself the appropriate regula-
tory classification, and (2) is the primary source of information on which Commission
enforcement is predicated. A constant source of difficulty for administrative regulatory agen-
cies like the FCC is that nearly all essential information necessary for effective regulation is in
the hands of the regulated industry. See Hagelin & Wimmer, Broadcast Deregulation and the
Administrative Responsibility to Monitor Policy Change. An Empirical Study of the Elimination
of Logging Requirements, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 201 (1986) (information from industry is essen-
tial to monitor and evaluate regulatory reform); see also Breyer, Two Models of Regulatory
Reform, 34 S.C.L. REV. 629, 631-35 (1983) (effective airline regulatory reform requires infor-
mation from industry).
288. In a sense, the block allocation plan provides certain guarantees that may be necessary
for a communications business to exist at all. For example, television receiver manufacturers
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of "one way ratchet" potentially at work. It is easier to create many small
bandwidths from one large bandwidth than it is to reassemble a large
bandwidth once it has been broken down.2 8 9 And there is much more free-
dom to design land mobile communications systems than there is in design-
ing a broadcast system, because land mobile transmitters may be placed
anywhere within the designated service area while a television station must
centrally locate its transmitter so that its signal is available throughout the
entire allocation area.2 90 To convert from television to land mobile, the flex-
ible licensee need only partition the available spectrum and begin service; but
to convert from land mobile to television, all the land mobile "pieces" must
be reassembled.29 1
IV. CONCLUSION
The Commission's proposal for a flexible radio service is an innovative
approach to solving a long-standing broadcast and land mobile spectrum
allocation dispute. The proposal attempts to respond to many commenta-
tor's criticisms of the conventional block frequency allocation process.
While the Commission undoubtedly has broad discretion to interpret the
1934 Act's public interest standard, it is questionable whether the Commis-
sion can define the public interest standard so broadly as to delegate to pri-
vate parties the basic spectrum allocation questions Congress delegated to
the Commission. At the same time, the Act does not allow the Commission
to define the public interest standard so narrowly as to exclude from consid-
eration many traditional public and societal concerns. Nevertheless, the
Commission seems determined to define the public interest in terms of stark
marketplace economics.
There are other troublesome practical difficulties unresolved by the Com-
mission's proposal. Even if authorized, a flexible radio service may never
should have a reasonable expectation that the purchasers of their receivers will, in fact, receive
television transmissions. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
289. In contrast to the six MHz bandwidth of a television channel, land mobile channels
typically are 25 kHz wide. Thus, there are potentially 240 land mobile channels available in
each television channel. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. It is also a tilted market
because a flexible radio service must be established in frequencies now used for television ser-
vice. There is no practical way for a television service to begin on land mobile frequencies. See
Robinson, supra note 39, at 1255 ("Although it might be feasible to transform broadcast into
nonbroadcast frequencies, it does not seem practicable to do the reverse because present sets
could not receive the new frequencies and manufacturers could not be expected to produce
special receivers for each location.").
290. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.685(a) (1986) (providing guidance to television licensees on opti-
mal location of central transmitter).
291. If the would-be television service provider offered compensation, the possibility exists
that exorbitant prices could be paid to "hold-out" land mobile services.
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actually become "flexible" when the economic barriers to change service are
large. Television broadcasters have millions of dollars invested in plants and
equipment. This investment is worthless to an entity wishing to engage in a
different type of communications service. It is unlikely that a television
broadcaster would abandon a multimillion dollar investment in fixed assets
for a try at an entrepreneurial alternative communications enterprise. But if
a flexible licensee providing television service does switch to a different type
of communications service, Commission review of the decision would be
minimal at best. Finally, the current block allocation system does offer some
administrative advantages. Under the current system, the Commission need
make a public interest comparison of diverse communications services only
once-by rulemaking, at the time the initial block of spectrum is allocated
for a Commission-specified communication service. Under a flexible radio
service, such decisions may have to be made each time a license is renewed.
On a challenge to an incumbent's license renewal, the Commission could be
faced with the task of comparing, on a public interest basis, two or more
fundamentally different types of communications services for each flexible
license being renewed. The Commission, therefore, may be undertaking a
potentially significant administrative burden.
However, the most troublesome issue is the delegation to private parties of
spectrum use decisions that Congress intended to delegate to the Commis-
sion. Thus, the flexible radio service proposal appears to transgress the
"trusteeship" model established by the 1934 Act and affirmed in the NBC
case and its progeny. Even so, the flexible radio service proposal would solve
some of the acknowledged deficiencies of the current block allocation pro-
cess. For the FCC to create a flexible radio service, the 1934 Act should be
modified. Specifically, the Act should (1) remove the periodic renewal re-
quirement for licensees in a flexible radio service; (2) declare that flexible
licensees may operate in Commission-designated spectrum subject to mini-
mal Commission supervision, and that such operation characteristics do not
constitute "ownership" for purposes of section 301; and (3) generally state
the desirability of allowing, where feasible, the use of local market forces to
directly influence communications in local areas without the need for the
Commission to interpret the public's wants and desires. If necessary, Con-
gress may wish to authorize a spectrum experiment.
If the Commission inaugurates a flexible radio service, it will stretch the
language of the Communications Act of 1934 significantly further than the
Act's drafters intended. The Act's vision of radio spectrum regulation
would, in effect, become no regulation at all. Moreover, to the extent there
is controversy concerning the fundamental meaning of a 1934 law in the
1980's, it should be Congress, not the Commission, that establishes or
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changes policy. The power to change the basic application of the Act clearly
resides with Congress. For these reasons, if the Commission wishes to pur-
sue establishment of a flexible radio service, it should seek and obtain clarify-
ing statutory authority.
Michael C Rau*
* The author is an employee of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB). The
views expressed in this Comment are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
position of the NAB or its members.
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